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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k). This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Final judgment was entered in the Third Judicial District Order, in and for Summit County on 
August 20, 1993, and defendants' Notice of Appeal was filed on September 7, 1993. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are (1) whether the District Court correctly ruled, as a matter 
of law, that defendant/appellee Robert L. Warburton's ("Warburton") Jeremy Ranch Lot 
Reservation Agreement ("Warburton LRA") created an easement in gross; and (2) whether the 
District Court correctly ruled that defendant/appellant Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan 
Association ("VBF") had actual or constructive notice of the Warburton LRA, or was placed on 
inquiry notice of Warburton's LRA. 
This appeal follows a grant of summary judgment in favor of Warburton. On review, the 
Court of Appeals must affirm summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and Warburton is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baumgart v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647 (Utah App. 1993). The standard of review is the correctness 
of the trial court's conclusions, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Loosli v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 849 P.2d 624 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
A. Warburton's LRA created an easement in gross. Maw v. Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy Dist., 20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 (1968); High v. Davis, et a/., 283 Or. 315, 
s-\alr\34850 
584 P.2d 725 (1978); Bradley v. Frazier Playgrounds, 110 Cal. App. 2d 436, 242 P.2d 958 
(1952). 
B. VBF had actual, constructive or inquiry notice of Warburton's interest, Stumph 
v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1987); Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983); Toland 
v. Corey Co., 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890); Salt Lake v. Garfield & Western Railway Co., 291 
P.2d 883 (Utah 1955); High v. Davis, 283 Or. 315, 584 P.2d 725 (1978); Bradley v. Frazier 
Park Playgrounds, 110 Cal. App. 2d 436, 242 P.2d 958 (1952). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action seeking a determination as to whether 
Warburton has a continuing, real property interest in the Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club. 
B. Course of Proceedings. This action was begun in 1988, when Warburton and 179 
others ("plaintiffs") sought to enjoin defendant VBF's impending foreclosure of the Jeremy 
Ranch development (including the golf course). When injunctive relief was denied, VBF 
foreclosed. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of whether the plaintiffs held easements in the golf course which survived VBF's 
foreclosure. 
The cross-motions for partial summary judgment were decided in plaintiffs' favor in 1991. 
Subsequently, plaintiffs sought two additional summary determinations: (1) that the Lot 
Reservation Agreements created a perpetual easement, and (2) that the 1991 summary judgment 
applied to specific plaintiffs, including Warburton. Defendants applied to the District Court for 
reconsideration of the 1991 summary judgment. Defendants concede that Warburton's LRA is 
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perpetual. On January 19, 1993, the District Court granted partial summary judgment holding 
that the 1991 summary judgment applied specifically to Warburton. The Court also denied 
defendants' motion for reconsideration. Other issues remained and went to trial in 1993. 
C. Disposition by District Court. The District Court granted plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and denied VBF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ruling that 
the sample Lot Reservation Agreement did grant an easement, and that such easement survived 
the foreclosure. 
A later ruling by the District Court specifically determined that Warburton's LRA created 
a perpetual easement in gross. 
Before trial, VBF moved for reconsideration of the District Court's ruling on the Cross-
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 2581), arguing that fact issues over notice precluded 
Partial Summary Judgment and that the District Court erred in considering extrinsic evidence. 
VBF's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. 
After trial, Judgment and Findings were entered which incorporated the earlier Orders of 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In or before 1979, The Jeremy Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, commenced the 
development of Jeremy Ranch, a residential real estate development to be associated with a 
golfing club. Gerald H. Bagley was the sole general partner of The Jeremy Ltd. (Aff. T. 
Bagley, R. 432-440; Aff. G. H. Bagley, R. 798-806). 
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2. In conjunction with the sale of residential lots, The Jeremy Ltd. coupled perpetual 
memberships, known as "Founding Memberships," in a to-be-established Jeremy Ranch Golf and 
Country Club. (Aff. T. Bagley, R. 432-440; Aff. G. H. Bagley, R. 798-806). 
3. These Founding Memberships were established by written agreements entitled "Lot 
Reservation Agreements" ("LRAs"), modeled after a "sample LRA" that was attached to 
defendants' brief as Exhibit D. 
4. Under this generic LRA, the purchaser acquired a reservation of a lot in the proposed 
subdivision surrounding the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, and a membership in the Jeremy Ranch 
Golf and Country Club as follows: 
2. Club Memberships. It is understood that a Lifetime Family Membership in 
The Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club is included with the purchase of a lot on 
the Jeremy Ranch. There are no monthly dues, nor can any dues ever be assessed. 
This Membership is transferable. It may be sold without a transfer fee. It is not 
assessable. 
5. On January 10th, 1981, Warburton entered into an LRA (R. 1171 - attached hereto 
as Exhibit 1) for the reservation of one lot with a total purchase price of $50,000. Warburton's 
LRA, however, differed substantially from the sample LRA in that it was expressly "perpetual" 
rather than lifetime, included "all Jeremy Ranch Club facilities," and was expressly binding upon 
"other owners, successors or assigns of the club." Warburton's LRA reads as follows: 
2. Club Membership. It is understood that a perpetual Family Membership in 
The Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club including all Jeremy Ranch Club facilities 
is included with the purchase of a lot on The Jeremy Ranch. There are no monthly 
dues, nor can any dues ever be assessed. This membership is transferable. It may 
be sold without a transfer fee. It is not assessable. The obligations and provisions 
to the members of the club shall be binding upon any other owners, successors or 
assigns of the club. 
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(Emphasis on additional language.) Warburton's LRA was subscribed by Gerald H. Bagley. 
Warburton paid $25,000 down. (Aff. Thomas Bagley, R. 445). 
6. Purchasers under the LRAs, including Warburton, were told that the rights granted 
by The Jeremy Ltd. under the LRAs were perpetual rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, 
clubhouse and facilities without regard to whom or what entity owned the property. (Aff. G. 
Bagley, R, 801-802). 
7. Warburton's $25,000 down payment was for the golf membership and was used to 
help pay for the completion of the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (Aff. T. Bagley, R. 443). 
8. During the spring and summer of 1982, The Jeremy Ltd., Gerald Bagley's 
partnership, began negotiations and discussions relative to arranging a loan from VBF through 
its agent, Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards Woodbury"), for construction 
of improvements to the residential subdivision surrounding the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. 
(Aff. of T. Bagley; R. 435, 436; Aff. August Brand R. 2745). 
9. Although the original loan documents were in the name of Richards Woodbury, VBF 
and its participating lenders funded the loan and Richards Woodbury only acted as the agent of 
VBF with respect to the loan. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435, 436; Aff. August Brand R. 2745). 
10. Under the standard LRA, the initial payment of $25,000 was for the golfing rights 
under the golf membership and an additional amount of $25,000 was payable for the purchase 
of a lot when the lot improvements were completed and county approval received for the 
subdivision. If the Founding Member did not make the additional payment and purchase a lot, 
the member could either continue to hold the golf membership in exchange for the initial 
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$25,000 payment or receive a refund of the $25,000 with interest in exchange for the 
membership rights. (Exhibit A to Defendants' Brief). 
11. VBF indicated to representatives of The Jeremy Ltd. that the existence of the LRA and 
the additional income from lot sales to Founding Members was a primary factor to VBF in 
determining whether to make the loan. This was because of the LRA provisions for payment 
of additional funds in the event the parties to such LRAs exercised the lot reservations and 
purchased lots in the subdivisions surrounding the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (Aff. of T. 
Bagley, R. 435). 
12. Prior to closing the subject loan, VBF discussed directly with representatives of The 
Jeremy Ltd. the existence of the LRAs which would be security for the loan and also discussed 
the existence of lifetime, dues-free memberships to the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (Aff. of T. 
Bagley, R. 435, 436). 
13. In August 1982, representatives of VBF and the secondary lenders attended the first 
annual Jeremy Ranch Golf Tournament at the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. While at the golf 
course, these representatives discussed the LRAs and the existence and rights of the golf course 
memberships with representatives of The Jeremy Ltd. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435, 436). 
14. Prior to the loan closing, The Jeremy Ltd. delivered all the original LRAs, including 
Warburton's, to VBF's agent Richards Woodbury.-' Copies of the LRAs were made and the 
- There remains a question of fact as to whether all the LRAs, including Warburton's, were 
delivered to VBF prior to closing. August Brand, Richards Woodbury's Senior Vice 
President, asserts in his affidavit (R. 2745, 2746) that all the LRAs were delivered by 
Richards Woodbury to VBF. VBF denies this. There is no dispute, however, that VBF's 
agent, Richards Woodbury, had all the LRAs prior to closing. 
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originals returned to The Jeremy Ltd. In September 1982, three months prior to the loan, 
Richards Woodbury conducted a survey of the parties to the LRA agreements to determine the 
number intending to purchase a lot. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435; Aff. of A. Brand, R. 2745). 
15. On November 26, 1982, Richards Woodbury entered into a Security Agreement (the 
"Security Agreement") with The Jeremy Ltd., granting and assigning all The Jeremy Ltd.'s 
interest in all the existing and future LRAs to Richards Woodbury as security for the loan. This 
Security Agreement was then assigned to VBF. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435; Aff. of A. Brand, 
R. 2746). 
16. On November 26, 1982, and in connection with the Security Agreement, The Jeremy 
Ltd. entered into an Assignment of Lot Reservation Agreements ("Assignment of LRAs") to 
Richards Woodbury, which Assignment of LRAs was then assigned to VBF. (Aff. of T. 
Bagley, R. 436; Aff. A. Brand, R. 2746; Assignment of LRAs attached to Defendants' Brief 
as Exhibit E). 
17. The sample LRA form was attached to the Assignment of LRAs. 
18. The Assignment of LRAs also included an attached Exhibit "A" which listed and 
identified 169 individuals or entities, including Warburton, which had entered into LRAs 
granting rights to use the golf course. The list also indicated LRAs had been entered into with 
respect to 208 lots. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 437; Aff. August Brand, R. 2746). 
19. On December 6, 1982, trust deeds were recorded in favor of Richards Woodbury with 
respect to the loan. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 438; Aff. A. Brand, R. 2747). 
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20. In October of 1988, plaintiffs learned of a Notice of Default Trustee's Sale served by 
VBF on its subsidiary JSC. Plaintiffs then filed their Complaint in this action and on October 
25, 1988, plaintiffs recorded their Lis Pendens in the records of the Summit County Recorder, 
Book 498, Page 309-10, relative to plaintiffs' rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (R. 
1-38). 
21. On November 28, 1988, VBF foreclosed under the above Trust Deeds and purchased 
the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, Clubhouse and facilities at the Trustee's Sale. (VBF Answer, 
par. 29, R. 119). 
22. On August 22, 1991, the lower court entered its Order of Summary Judgment (Exhibit 
2, R. 840-843) ruling that, based upon the sample LRA, the original plaintiffs, including 
Warburton, hold easements in gross in the property described as the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course 
and Clubhouse facilities that were not extinguished by VBF's foreclosure. 
23. On January 15, 1993, the lower court entered its Minute Entry (Exhibit 3, R. 3112-
3118), ruling inter alia: 
a. Granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment applying the 
August 22, 1991 ruling to certain specific plaintiffs, including Warburton, based upon 
their respective individual LRAs; 
b. Denying defendant's motion for reconsideration of the August 22, 1991 
order; and 
c. Ruling that certain LRAs, including Warburton's LRA, were perpetual. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, Warburton's LRA creates in him a perpetual real estate interest in and to 
the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course and related facilities that survives VBF's foreclosure. 
Warburton's LRA differs substantially from the sample LRA in that it is expressly "perpetual," 
applies to related facilities and is expressly binding upon future "owners, successors or assigns 
of the club." 
Warburton's LRA is not defeated by the statute of frauds. It is sufficiently descriptive of 
the parties, interest conveyed and property involved. Given the differing interpretations placed 
upon Warburton's LRA by the defendants, it was proper for the lower court to consider 
extraneous evidence as to contractual intent. Specifically, it was proper for the lower court to 
consider the affidavits of the Bagleys in interpreting Warburton's LRA. 
Even if Warburton's LRA does not fully comply with the statute of frauds, Warburton 
nonetheless has an equitable easement because of his financial contribution to the creation of the 
golf course, coupled with the written and oral representations of The Jeremy Ltd. 
VBF had actual, constructive or inquiry notice of Warburton's LRA prior to the closing. 
Any remaining questions of fact are not determinative of these issues. Consequently, as a matter 
of law, VBF foreclosure does not eliminate Warburton's easement. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is defendants' appeal from the lower court's determination that Warburton continues 
to hold a real property interest (easement in gross) in and to the Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country 
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Club. In challenging this determination, defendants disregard three significant and determinative 
factors. First, defendants base their entire argument upon a generic "sample LRA," and fail to 
mention the only LRA before the Court, i.e., Warburton's. Second, appellants disregard the 
fact that Warburton's substantial payments were used for the construction and development of 
the golf club. Third, appellants contend that, because they were not informed of the precise 
"label" for Warburton's interest, they are not charged with notice even though they were 
informed of and had access to the document creating Warburton's interest. 
More detailed arguments follow. However, on the front end of this brief it may be helpful 
to apprise the Court of the following: 
(1) Warburton's LRA 
Examination of Warburton's LRA reveals significant and determinative 
differences from the sample LRA. These differences were the result of negotiation. 
Instead of a lifetime membership, Warburton's LRA is expressly "perpetual." Rather 
than an interest in just the golf club, Warburton's LRA applies to "all Jeremy Ranch 
facilities." Third, and unlike the sample LRA, Warburton's LRA expressly provides 
that the interest thereby created "shall be binding upon any other owners, successors 
or assigns of the club." 
(2) Appellants would have the Court believe that Warburton's "membership" 
is nothing more than any other country club membership. To the contrary, 
Warburton's membership was an integral part of the development of Jeremy Ranch 
Golf Club. It is a perpetual, transferable interest in real property. The Founding 
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Members' front-end payments were used for the creation of the golf course, without 
which there would have been no Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club. 
(3) Appellants contend that, because the sample LRA or Warburton's LRA did 
not expressly state that they created an "easement," they are somehow relieved of the 
fact that they knew, before the closing, of the existence of and language creating the 
Founding Members' interests. The absence of a "label" does not alter the fact of 
notice. 
I. WARBURTON HOLDS AN AFFIRMATIVE EASEMENT IN GROSS THAT 
SURVIVES VBF'S FORECLOSURE. 
Confronted with first the sample LRA, and thereafter Warburton's LRA, the lower court 
ruled that Warburton holds a perpetual easement in gross in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Club that 
survives VBF's foreclosure. 
It is axiomatic that an easement is created when one is granted a right to use the property 
of another for some specific purpose. Restatement of Property, Section 450(a) (1944); Kuhlman 
v. Rivera, 701 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1985); Laurence v. Kruckmeyer, 605 P.2d 466 (Ariz. 1979). 
An "affirmative" easement is one which grants the right to enter and make active use of the 
servient estate. Rahabiv. Morrison, 440 N.Y.S.2d941 (N.Y.A.D. 1981). Additionally, "[a]n 
affirmative easement entitles the owner thereof to use the land subject to the easement by doing 
acts which, were it not for the easement, he would not be privileged to do." Restatement of 
Property, Section 451 (1944). An easement is said to be "in gross" where it is a personal right 
to use the property of another rather than a right appurtenant to any dominant estate or land 
s:\alr\34850 
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possessed by the easement holder. Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984); Restatement 
of Property, Section 454 (1944); Evans v. Holloway Sand & Gravel Inc., 308 N.W.2d 440 
(Mich. 1981). 
Warburton's rights in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities constitute an 
affirmative easement in gross. Warburton was granted a perpetual right to use the Jeremy Ranch 
Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities. Such right is personal to Warburton and his family 
independent of any property ownership and could be transferred. The Jeremy Ltd. granted such 
rights as perpetual rights to use the golf course and facilities regardless of subsequent owners 
of the property. Unlike the sample LRA, Warburton's LRA expressly provides that those 
perpetual rights "shall be binding upon any other owners, successors or assigns of the club." 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar case in Maw v. Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy Dist., 20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 (1968), where it held that shooting privileges 
at a gun club were in the nature of an affirmative easement in gross. In that case, the Ogden 
Duck Club entered into an agreement with grantor Annie C. Maw to acquire a right of way over 
Maw's property in exchange for which it provided grantor's named sons non-assessable shooting 
privileges on the shooting grounds of the gun club. The agreement further provided that in any 
year the shooting privileges of the named sons could be transferred to one designated grandson. 
With respect to these rights to use the gun club, the Utah Supreme Court classified the right to 
the use of the property as an easement in gross: 
There was before the trial court a clear and unambiguous agreement which expressly 
granted shooting privileges to designated individuals. This shooting privilege was in 
the nature of a non-commercial easement in gross.... 
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Id. at 197 (Emphasis added). 
Other jurisdictions have arrived at similar conclusions. In High v. Davis, et al., 283 Or. 
315, 584 P.2d 725 (1978) (Exhibit 4), the issue before the court was whether membership 
agreements conveying exclusive hunting, fishing and recreational rights conveyed interests in 
land that would have priority over all but bona fide purchasers without notice of interests. As 
part of the overall sale of a development, Davis sold property that was coupled with 
memberships that provided for the exclusive right to hunt, fish and use the property in 
perpetuity. After the sale of some memberships, the development ran into financial trouble. 
On the question of priorities, the court held that the memberships, because of "the element of 
participation in the soil," created an interest in the land itself. 
In Bradley v. Frazier Park Playgrounds, 110 Cal. App. 2d 436, 242 P.2d 958 (1952) 
(Exhibit 5), the California appellate court was faced with a case remarkably similar to the instant 
one. Bradley involved a real estate promotion. As an integral part of the sale of lots, the 
developer offered membership in a to-be-constructed development. As the court noted, "[o]ne 
of the selling points for the lots was the representation that with each lot the purchaser would 
receive the right to membership in a 'Rod and Reel Club' which club would own and operate 
the clubhouse and grounds, and which would maintain fish in the lakes, and would carry on the 
usual activities of a country club." Id. at 959. Again, according to the court, "[fjrom the 
inception of the subdivision, apparently there was great emphasis placed on the value of the area 
as a playground spot, and the fact that the property owners would be able to use the lakes, 
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clubhouse, the playgrounds and the picnic grounds, through their membership in the Rod and 
Reel Club and by virtue of their ownership of the lots." Id. at 959, 960. 
The development fell on hard times and was ultimately acquired from a security holder. 
The ultimate title holder sought to exclude the members from use of and access to the club. The 
court ruled that the property owners held an easement to the use of the grounds, clubhouse, and 
lakes, i.e., to the Rod and Reel Club, that survived the foreclosure of security interests. 
Similarly, Warburton's rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, like the shooting 
privileges in Maw, the hunting and fishing memberships in Davis, and the recreational 
memberships in Bradley, constitute an easement in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. This is 
specifically so because as in Maw, Davis and Bradley, Warburton's rights arose out of a real 
estate transaction that was intended to benefit the servient estate, i.e., the golf course. 
II. WARBURTON'S LRA FULLY COMPLIES WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Rather than directly addressing the question of whether Warburton's LRA creates an 
interest in land, defendants instead assert the statute of frauds as a defense. In other words, 
defendants assert that even if an interest in land was intended, it was not conveyed properly and 
therefore is not protected. Defendants rely entirely upon the codified statute of frauds and the 
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1970 case of Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), for their defense.2' 
Defendants' arguments must fail for the following reasons: 
A. The Intent of Warburton's LRA was to Create an Easement. 
As this Court recognized in Wasatch Mines, the intent of the parties is determinative as to 
whether an agreement creates an easement or other interest in land. In Wycoffv. Barton, 646 
P.2d 756 (Utah 1982), this Court further held that a conveyance of an easement must be 
construed against the grantor, and "the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of 
the parties, and the object to be obtained are also to be considered." Id. at 758. The Court also 
stated that where there is some doubt as to the meaning of the conveyance, "the court may also 
look to the practical construction placed upon the instrument by the parties."-7 Id. 
11
 In Utah, the statute of frauds is codified in Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-1 (1953): 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, 
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same . . . . 
Wasatch Mines addressed the question of whether an agreement to allow the removal of soil 
constituted a profit a prendre, i.e., the transfer of an interest in land. In Wasatch Mines, 
the Court acknowledged that a transfer of an interest in land does not have to be by deed, 
but may also be by other forms of writing. The Court then analyzed the elements of such 
a writing, including the intent to create an interest in land and a description of the land to 
which the easement applies. 
-
7
 Defendants attempt to avoid the intent of the parties by stating that the testimony of the 
plaintiffs and The Jeremy Ltd. is irrelevant to the issue of what type of interest was granted 
to plaintiffs. Defendants instead seek to impose their own view of the intent of the parties 
without support of any statement of the parties to the LRAs themselves. The intent of the 
parties as expressed in the depositions of plaintiff and others and the affidavit of Tom 




It is in this area of intent that the differences between Warburton's LRA and the sample 
LRA are most poignant. In this regard it should be noted that the lower court ruled that the 
sample LRA did create an easement in gross. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the 
Court does not find that the sample LRA created an easement in gross, there can be little doubt 
that Warburton's LRA did. (The Court is directed to Warburton's LRA that is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A.) 
Where the sample LRA used the word "lifetime" to describe the membership, Warburton's 
LRA inserts the word "perpetual." More significantly, Warburton's LRA inserts the following 
language that does not appear in the sample LRA: 
The obligations and provisions to the members of the club shall be binding upon any other 
owners, successors or assigns of the club. 
The parties to the Warburton LRA clearly intended to create a perpetual interest in the golf 
course. Warburton was granted a perpetual, irrevocable, transferable right to use the Jeremy 
Ranch Golf Course. In consideration of these permanent rights, Warburton contributed 
substantial funds which were used to construct the golf course on which he was granted golfing 
privileges. Warburton did not pay this significant consideration with the intention of only 
obtaining some form of license which was transitory, temporary, or revocable at will to use a 
golf course that was not yet constructed. 
Furthermore, it is significant that the affidavit of Gerald Bagley on behalf of The Jeremy 
Ltd. clarifies the intent that plaintiffs' rights are easements. According to Mr. Bagley, the sole 
general partner of The Jeremy Ltd.: 
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Purchasers under the LRAs were told by myself and authorized sales personnel that 
the rights granted by the Jeremy, Ltd. under the LRAs were perpetual rights to use 
the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities without regard to who or what 
entity owned the property. 
(Aff. G. Bagley, f 8, R. 801, 802). Both the language of Warburton's LRA and the grantor of 
Warburton's LRA could not be more clear. Warburton was granted a perpetual right, i.e., an 
easement in gross, to access and use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. 
B. The Jeremy Ranch Golf Course Which is the Subject of Warburton's Easement 
is Sufficiently Described in Warburton's LRA. 
Defendants argue that Warburton's LRA does not sufficiently describe the property 
subject to the easement, and thus does not create an easement. This argument is meritless. 
Warburton's LRA provides in part: 
1. Reservation Agreement: For deposit received of $5,000.00 and $20,000.00 
on or before May 1, 1981, on the total purchase price of FIFTY-THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($50,000.00), the DEVELOPER promises to reserve for the 
PURCHASER one (1) lot in the proposed subdivision surrounding The Jeremy Ranch 
Golf Course to be constructed on The Jeremy Ranch property located in Section 1, 
2, and 3, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
It must be assumed that this legal description applied to the entirety of the Jeremy Ranch 
property, a portion of which was intended to be developed into a golf course and related 
facilities. Obviously, this description does not precisely describe the golf course, but it does 
describe the property upon which the golf course would be built. 
In Utah, it is not necessary that property be described by metes and bounds, but only 
that it cannot be confused with other property. In the Matter of the Estate of Louis J. Bonny, 
600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979). Bonny involved the purported conveyance of an interest in land. 
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No deed was ever given, but three receipts existed with references to "11 acres of property at 
Alpine." Those challenging the conveyance contended that the receipt did not comply with the 
statute of frauds. The Bonny Court first noted that the three receipts could be taken together to 
constitute the required "writing." With respect to the property description, the Court set forth 
the following test: 
All parties agree that decedent had 11.6 acres at Alpine. Though the property is not 
described by metes and bounds or with reference to monuments, it is sufficient if the 
memorandum identifies the property with such particularity that it cannot be confused 
with, or claimed to apply to any other property. In such a case, the exact description 
may be shown by parol evidence. 
Id. at pp. 550, 551. 
As in Bonny, all parties must agree that there is only one golf course on the described 
Jeremy Ranch property. There can be no argument that the "Jeremy Ranch Golf Course" can 
be confused with any other property. Warburton's LRA clearly meets the property description 
test. The intent of Warburton's LRA to create an easement is also clearly delineated. Thus, 
his LRA fully complies with the statute of frauds. 
III. ANY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WHICH THE LOWER COURT MAY HAVE 
CONSIDERED WAS PROPER TO RESOLVE ANY AMBIGUITY IN THE LRA. 
Defendants contend that the lower court should not have ruled as it did because of certain 
extrinsic evidence which the court may have considered in ruling that the sample LRA language 
created easements. Defendants' current argument contradicts the position they have previously 
taken in this case. Defendants asserted the ambiguity of missing terms in the LRA language as 
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a basis for disputing the easement claim.-7 Defendants now contend, however, that the LRA 
is not ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence should not have been considered. 
Parol or extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the contractual intent of the parties to 
an ambiguous agreement. Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah App. 1991). Because the 
lower court held that the language in the LRA was "somewhat ambiguous," any extrinsic 
evidence which the lower court may have considered was proper in view of the "many 
questions" which defendants claim were raised by the language of the LRA. 
Defendants place unwarranted reliance on Martinez v. Martinez, 604 P.2d 366, 368 (N.M. 
1979), to support their argument. In Martinez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the 
intent of the parties regarding an easement is determined from all the attendant circumstances 
and that the behavior of the parties may fill in missing details of the agreement creating an 
easement. Utah's Supreme Court has similarly held that the intent of the parties must be 
considered in determining the extent of the easement and the agreement creating it must be 
construed against the property owner. Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1982). 
-
;
 Defendants raised the ambiguity and questions unanswered in the LRA as a basis to attack 
the easement claim: 
For example: Can the course be modified ? Can it be closed ? What 
constitutes family ? Can course play be regulated ? Can course play be 
interrupted for tournaments ? What if no lot is ever purchased ? 
These questions and many others have no answer in the language of 
the Lot Reservation Agreements. 
(Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 
25) 
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Defendants attempt to avoid discussing the intent of the parties by stating that the testimony 
of the Bagleys is irrelevant to the issue of what type of interest was granted to plaintiffs. 
Defendants instead seek to impose their own view of the intent of the parties without support of 
any statement of the parties to Warburton's LRA. The intent of the parties as expressed in the 
affidavits of Gerald Bagley and Tom Bagley as to the interests conveyed in the Jeremy Ranch 
Golf Course are determinative on this issue. No evidence has been offered, and none exists, 
which would contradict the clear intent of the parties to create an easement. 
IV. WARBURTON ALSO HOLDS AN EQUITABLE EASEMENT. 
Even assuming that Warburton's LRA is somehow deficient under the statute of frauds, 
Warburton nonetheless holds an equitable easement. Utah's Supreme Court has recognized that 
an equitable easement can be created orally when coupled with expenditures made in permanent 
improvements to the land. See Wells v. Marcus, 480 P.2d 129 (Utah 1971). Wells involved a 
dispute over the use of culinary water from a common source. The parties had worked together 
in constructing a pipeline to convey water from this common source. This pipeline traversed 
plaintiffs land. After the dispute arose, the question became whether defendant held an 
easement or merely a license. The Court initially acknowledged that there was no writing 
creating an easement and the claimed easement would normally be defeated by the statute of 
frauds. However, the Court recognized an exception based upon the equitable doctrine of part 
performance: 
Under the equitable doctrine of part performance, a verbal agreement for an easement 
has been enforced by some courts. This doctrine applies to all cases in which a court 
of equity would entertain a suit for specific performance if the alleged contract had 
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been in writing. * * * If expenditures be made in permanent improvements inuring 
to the benefit of a licensor under an express oral license given by him, then such 
license becomes irrevocable, and, if it relates to the use or occupation of real estate, 
it becomes an easement. 
Id. at 130. 
Although the Wells court did not find an equitable easement, their conclusion was based 
upon the absence of even an oral agreement. In the instant case an oral agreement clearly exists. 
Dr. Bagley represented to Warburton that upon payment of $25,000, which was to be used to 
build the golf course, Warburton would have the perpetual right to use the facility and that this 
right would run with the land. This representation is reflected in Warburton's LRA. 
Warburton, therefore, has an equitable easement. 
In Bradley v. Frazier Park Playgrounds, 242 P.2d 958 (Cal. App. 1952), as previously 
mentioned, a case very similar to the instant one, Bradley and others sued Frazier Park to 
establish their right to use certain recreational facilities for hunting and fishing. These facilities 
were included within the real estate development in which plaintiffs had bought lots relying upon 
a salesman's representation that they would have permanent use of the facilities without 
restriction. A subsequent owner of the development excluded plaintiffs' use of the facilities. 
The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to an equitable easement to use such facilities, even 
though no such right of use or easement had been granted by written conveyance, and that 
defendant was bound by this easement: 
The evidence fully supports the court's finding that it was the intention of the 
subdivider and of its sales agents to create and set aside a portion of the subdivision 
as a 'commons' or playgrounds, for the specified use and benefit of the purchasers of 
lots, in perpetuity. The subdivision map so indicates. The price obtained for the lots 
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clearly indicates such rights were considered a portion of the price paid. Appellant 
Holland and his predecessors in interest apparently had knowledge of these facts or, 
at least, evidence of these claimed rights and privileges was, as found by the court, 
so notorious and of such common knowledge as to impart notice of them. 
Id. at p. 958. 
Like the plaintiffs in Bradley, Warburton bought a lot in Jeremy Ranch relying upon the 
representation that he would have the perpetual right to use the golf course and related facilities. 
Thus, under the doctrine of equitable easement, Warburton holds an easement in the Jeremy 
Ranch Golf Club as a matter of law. 
V. WARBURTON'S EASEMENT AND RIGHTS THEREUNDER ARE CONSISTENT 
WITH OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY BY THE JEREMY LTD. AND ITS 
SUCCESSORS IN INTERESTS. 
Defendants place undue and irrelevant emphasis on the facts that the Jeremy Ranch Golf 
Club is a "proprietary club" and not an "equity club," and that The Jeremy Ltd. and not 
plaintiffs were the "owners" of the Golf Course. Defendants fail to make a point with these 
assertions. All these facts, assuming them to be true, are entirely consistent with the easement 
claimed by plaintiffs in the Golf Course property. After all, an easement is not the same as an 
interest in fee simple.-7 
An easement is an interest in property which, though 
distinct from an ownership interest in the land itself, nevertheless confers upon the 





 Chournos v. D 'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Lindhorst v. Wright, 616 P.2d 450, 454 
(Okl. App. 1980) (an easement does not vest title, but only a limited right to use property 
of another); Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 14 Utah 2d 364, 384 P.2d 590 (1963) (easement is only 
privilege of limited use and does not convey ownership). 
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Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 387 (Colo. 1985) (emphasis added); see also 
Kennedy v. Bond, 460 P.2d 809 (N.M. 1969); Boyd v. McDonald, 408 P.2d 717, 720 (Nev. 
1965) (easement distinct from ownership). It is clear, therefore, that Warburton's golfing 
privileges and easement are consistent with ownership of the Golf Course property by The 
Jeremy Ltd. and any of its successors in interest. 
The fact that Warburton's LRA makes reference to "memberships" in no respect limits the 
rights Warburton obtained. The "memberships" clearly represent the golfing privileges and 
rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course Property acquired by payment of substantial 
consideration. Such rights are expressly perpetual, irrevocable and fully transferable. These 
rights are not analogous to mere membership of an association or health club. They are 
significant interests in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course property which, just as the shooting 
privileges at the gun club in Maw, supra, constitute easements in the property that are expressly 
binding upon VBF, a successor to The Jeremy Ltd.'s interest. 
VI. VBF HAD SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF WARBURTON'S INTEREST PRIOR TO THE 
CLOSING TO CREATE A PRIORITY AND, THEREFORE, SUCH INTEREST IS 
NOT AFFECTED BY THE FORECLOSURE SALE. 
Warburton's right to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course has priority over all rights and 
claims of VBF and its successors to the property, under the loans, trust deeds, Security 
Agreements, or otherwise. Warburton's easement in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course was created 
prior to the original VBF loan and Trust Deed recorded December 6, 1982. Prior to the loan, 
VBF had actual, constructive or inquiry notice of the rights granted to Warburton to use the 
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Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities. In fact, VBF took a security interest in, 
and an assignment of, the very LRA which granted Warburton membership rights. 
Defendants argue that the lower court erred in determining that VBF had notice of 
Warburton's LRA because there remain issues of fact. The only disputed question is whether 
the actual LRAs, including Warburton's, were delivered to VBF prior to the closing. VBF 
contends that it had only seen the sample LRA and a list of all those who held LRA, including 
Warburton. There is no dispute as to whether VBF's agent, Richards Woodbury, had all the 
LRAs prior to closing: he did. Notice to an agent, as a matter of law, constitutes notice to the 
principal. Johnson Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 279, 358 
P.2d 337 (1961); Time Finance Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., Inc., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 
873 (1969). 
Even assuming that VBF did not have Warburton's LRA, and that it is not bound by the 
actual notice to its agent, VBF is nonetheless precluded from raising the notice issue as a 
defense. It is well established that a subsequent purchaser is deemed to have actual notice when 
such party has sufficient information to put it on inquiry notice of the claimed interest. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-6 (1986), conveyances of real 
property are binding upon persons with "actual notice," even though not 
properly acknowledged and recorded. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that "actual notice" will be imputed "if a party dealing with the land had 
information of facts which would put a prudent man upon inquiry and 
which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the 
title. 
Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820, 821 (Utah App. 1987); Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 
(Utah 1983); Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890). 
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In Salt Lake v. Garfield & Western Railway Co., 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955), plaintiffs' 
predecessor had obtained a decree in condemnation to increase the width of a right-of-way. A 
deed to defendants did not specifically reference this decree, although it was visually apparent 
that plaintiffs were using the subject property. Defendants contended that the recitation in their 
deeds could not reasonably charge the defendants with constructive notice of the decree in 
condemnation so as to defeat the defendants' claim that they were purchasers in good faith 
without notice. The Court held that defendants had sufficient information to put a reasonably 
prudent person on notice and to charge him with the duty to inquire further to ascertain what the 
facts were. The Court adopted the following standard: 
Means of knowledge and knowledge itself, are in legal effect, the same thing 
where there is enough to put a party on inquiry. Knowledge which one has or ought 
to have under the circumstances is imputed to him. When a party has information 
or knowledge of certain extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount to, nor 
tend to show, an actual notice, but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent 
man upon an inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim, or right, and the 
circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made and followed up with reasonable 
care and diligence, would lead to the discovery of the truth, to a knowledge of the 
interest, claim, or right which really exists, then the party is absolutely charged 
with a constructive notice of such interest, claim, or right. In other words, whatever 
fairly puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice where the means of knowledge are 
at hand; and if he omits to inquire, he is then chargeable with all the facts which, by 
a proper inquiry, he might have ascertained. A person has no right to shut his eyes 
or his ears to avoid information, and then say that he had no notice; he does 
wrong not to heed the 'signs and signals' seen by him. It will not do to remain 
wilfully ignorant of a thing readily ascertainable, and it is no excuse for failure to 
make an inquiry, that if made, it might have failed to develop the truth. 
Id. at 885, 886 (emphasis in bold added). 
In High v. Davis, cited previously at p. 13, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court was dealing 
with hunting and fishing rights sold in conjunction with the sale of real estate. These 
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"memberships" were sold prior to the exercise of security rights in the real property. In addition 
to whether interest in land was conveyed (see Point I), the question was whether the mortgagee 
had sufficient notice of the memberships to deprive it of priority. The mortgagee, prior to 
closing, had actual notice of founders' memberships in an exclusive hunting and fishing club on 
the involved property. The court held that the mortgagee had sufficient notice to give rise to 
a duty of inquiry, and that the failure to so inquire defeated any priority of a security interest 
over the members' rights. 
VBF certainly had, at the very least, this type of "inquiry notice" of Warburton's perpetual 
right to use the golf course by virtue of its dealings and transactions prior to the loan closing, 
including receipt of a sample of the LRAs which created such rights. VBF clearly knew, prior 
to the loans, that the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course involved memberships granting rights to use 
the golf course. VBF even discussed such memberships with The Jeremy Ltd. representatives. 
All the homeowners' golf memberships/easements, including Warburton's, were granted by The 
Jeremy Ltd. prior to the loan of VBF. VBF took a security interest and assignment of all the 
LRAs, the very documents which created and granted the memberships/easements. VBF may 
not now shut its eyes to avoid information which was readily ascertainable prior to making the 
loan. 
The Assignment of LRAs which VBF took as security for its loans included a standard 
LRA form. The attached form clearly granted the above described rights to use the golf course 
and facilities. Paragraph 2 of the LRA form contained the following provision: 
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It is understood that a Lifetime Family Membership in the Jeremy Ranch 
Golf and Country Club is included with the purchase of a lot on the Jeremy 
Ranch. There are no monthly dues, nor can any dues ever be assessed. 
This Membership is transferable. It may be sold without a transfer fee. It 
is not assessable. 
The Assignment of LRAs also contained a list of 169 LRA holders, including Warburton, 
representing 208 lots and memberships. The Jeremy Ltd. furnished all the original LRAs to 
Richards Woodbury and in September of 1982, three months prior to the loan, VBF's agent 
Richards Woodbury conducted a survey of these agreements. 
There exist no genuine issues of material fact. Warburton's rights and interests in the 
Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities, therefore, are effective and enforceable 
against VBF with actual, inquiry, and constructive notice of such interests as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Warburton's rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course and Clubhouse facilities is an 
affirmative easement and is enforceable against VBF and its successors in the Jeremy Ranch Golf 
Course property. VBF had actual notice of such rights and interests in the LRAs prior to 
making the loans on the Jeremy Ranch property. Therefore, Warburton's membership rights 
have priority over the encumbrances of VBF and the Lenders and are unaffected by any 
foreclosure thereof. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court's ruling on summary judgment be 
affirmed. 
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LOT HKSKHVATION AGKKEMKNT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this IQ- day 
otO.HJjtA.-'UL 3 98/, by and between THE JEREMY LTD., A LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, hereinafter called "DEVELOPER", and 'S^±^^L^2Li— 
^iJyu.lXh-n^ ^/C hereinafter called "PURCHASER"; 
CONSIDERATION of the covenants herein contained, it /l^U^tC^g ^'r-' 
001171 
is mutually agreed between the parties hereto as follows: 
C7J C/-'-r>c ^ ** Reservation Agreement: For deposit received of 
TWENTY-riVE TI10U0AND DOLLAng-(-$2S , 000 . 00 )? on the total purchase 
price of FI FIT-THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000-00), the DEVELOPER 
promises to reserve for the PURCHASER one (1) lot in the proposed 
subdivision surrounding The Jeremy Ranch Golf Course to be con-
structed on The Jeremy Ranch property located in Section 1, 2, 
and 3, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Summit County, State of Utah. The PURCHASER shall have the right 
to select any lot in the proposed subdivision which has not been 
previously sold or committed to other parties at the time the 
PURCHASER'S rights under this Reservation Agreement are exercised. 
If, for any reason, PURCHASER decides to withdraw the reservation 
deposit, it will be refunded upon demand plus 7% (seven percent) 
interest per annum prorated for the number of days it has been 
held by the DEVELOPER, but such demand may not be made until the 
deposit has been held by the DEVELOPER for at least three years. 1^#^ 
^perpetual VOf^ 
2. Club Membership. I t i s understood that a LifiliTno-
Family Membership in The .Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club*is 
•including a l l Jeremy Ranch Club fac i l i t i e s 
included with the purchase of a l o t on The Jeremy Ranch. There 
are no monthly d u e s , nor can any dues ever be a s s e s s e d . This 
membership i s t r a n s f e r a b l e . It may be s o l d without a t r a n s f e 
f e e . I t i s not a s s e s s a b l e . TTie obligations and provisions to the members of 
trie club shall be binding upon any other owners, successors or assigns of the club. 
3 . Term. This Reservat ion Agreement s h a l l extend t o 
and exp ire at the time of the s a l e or commitment t o other p a r t i e s 
o f the l a s t l o t in the proposed s u b d i v i s i o n r e f e r r e d t o above. I f 
PURCHASER has not e x e r c i s e d h i s r i g h t s under t h i s agreement p r i o r 
t o that t ime, t h e l o t w i l l be f o r f e i t e d , and the DEVELOPER s h a l l 
keep the $25,000 d e p o s i t , and i t s h a l l be cons idered t o be payment 
in f u l l for the aforementioned Jeremy Golf Club Li fe t ime Membership, 
rvawoiorvor c^all aive 30 dav notice to purchaser as time to make his lot selection. 
.„..,„„ Ai:r.*<:mont shall bo csrreJs.J'l by writlon miLiiu lo 
DKVKLOPER AT 735G Wasatch Doulovard, S:i 1 L I.:il;i! i'ity, 111 ah, on 
or prior to the expiration of the term hereof. Ti Lit! to Um 
lot may not be taken prior to the time 1 he lot to he sulci*.led 
has been properly platted and registered, all required approvals-
have been obtained from governmental agencies having juris-
diction over the property and the lot may be legally sulci. The! 
balance of the purchase price shall be paid at closing, which 
shall be within thirty, (30) days from the date upon which the 
agreement is exercised, at which time all general property taxes 
shall be prorated. At closing, the DEVELOPER shall, at its 
expense, provide to PURCHASER, a policy of title insurance sub-
ject only to standard and recorded or platted casements, restric-
tions, and reservations. Final conveyance shall be made by 
Warranty Deed conveying title free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances except those which are shown as exceptions in the 
title policy. 
5. This Agreement shall not be assigned by the PURCHASER 
to any other party and the rights granted hereunder are not trans-
i t ~k ^C w*v^;>^^L _04tU*i 
ferable without the prior written consent of DEVEIOPER^ with the 
exception of those rights in paragraph 2 above. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed Lhe I r 
names or caused the names of their duly authorized agents to be 
signed hereunder. 
DEVELOPER: 
THE JEREMY LTD., A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
* * e r t L. Warburtorr M.D. 
°/AL u a n d o n R- "^bur ton 1484 Harvard Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
x3 th i s folic 
Purchaser 's number i s 
and i t i s understood lows 
185, pr ior reservat ion numbers 
for phases 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 . By: 
PURCHASER: *
 A ^ .&< 
• I f $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 i s pa id by {*£ 
f Si 
\ I?JM, •PURCHASER" 
w i l l r e c e i v e 5000 s h a r e s o  unny H i l l Mines r e g i s t e r e d s tock . 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAX GREENHALGH, et al.. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA BEACH FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATE, a foreign 
corporation; ATLANTIC PERMANENT 
FEDERAL, a foreign corporation; 
JEFFERSON SAVINGS & LOAN, a 
foreign corporation; THE JEREMY, 
LTD, a Utah limited partnership; 
JEREMY SERVICE CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; ASSOCIATED 
TITLE COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
The Motion of plaintffs' for Partial Summary Judgment, 
defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and 
defendants7 Motion to Strike Affidavit of Gerald H. Bagley came 
on regularly before the above entitled Court on May 6, 1991, at 
3:00 p.m., the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. Plaintiffs' 
were represented by Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. 
Fitts, Esq. Defendants were represented by George A. Hunt, Esq. 
The Court, having considered the memoranda and affidavits 
submitted and arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in 
the premises, and in accordance with the Court's Memorandum 
UKD£K Ut FAKT1AL. . 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ' \e //^'n" 
Civil No. 10005 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
NO. „+m F I L E D 
AUG 2 3 1991 
Clerk 9$ Summit Ceuirty « 
w 
teptftyCto 
GREENHALGH V VIRGINIA BEACH PAGE 2 ORDER 
Decision of July 11, 1991, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The court denies defendants' Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Gerald H. Bagley in its entirety, but strikes those 
portions of the Affidavit indicated as follows: 
a. The last sentence of paragraph 2 is stricken 
except that portion which refers to discussions relating the 
subject matter stated herein. 
b. The testimony relating to the corporate 
structure of defendants is stricken. 
c. Paragraph 7 of the Affidavit is stricken. 
d. The portions of paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 stating 
that Richards-Woodbury was an agent of Virginia Beach Federal 
Savings and Loan are stricken. 
e. The portions of the first sentence of paragraphs 
16 and 24 referring to the state of mind of defendants are 
stricken. Those portions referring to discussions involving 
affiant are not stricken. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
granted. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
3. Plaintiffs7 hold easements in gross in the property 
described as the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course and Clubhouse 
facilities. 
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4. The easements in gross include the right of the 
purchaser (founder member) and the purchasers family, for the 
lifetime of the purchaser, to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course 
and club house facilities subject to the same reasonable rules 
and regulations as other members or users with the exception 
that plaintiffs as Founder Members are not required to pay green 
fees, monthly dues for the right to use the course and clubhouse 
and are not subject to periodic assessments. These Founding 
Members rights are transferrable and irrevocable during the 
lifetime of the founding member. 
5. Plaintiffs are entitled to exercise said rights 
without unreasonable interference from defendants, their 
successors and assigns. 
DATED this
 c^ >/ c^ day of August, 1991. 
FRANK G. NOI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
B00K.UPAGF21O 00084, 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order of Partial Summary Judgment, postage 
prepaid, to the following, this c^ x^ < day of August, 1991: 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Stanford P. Pitts 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
300 Deseret Book Building 
4 0 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
George A. Hung 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P. 0. Box 45678 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Max Greenhalgh, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan 
Association; Jeremy Service Corp., et al., 
Defendants. 
Now before the Court are numerous outstanding motions. The Court has reviewed 
memos submitted in connection with said motions, has heard oral argument, has ruled from the 
bench on certain of the motions, and has also reviewed the proposed order regarding the Court's 
bench ruling together with the objections thereto and now consolidates all of it's rulings into this 
one order: 
1. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING 
APPLICATION OF AUGUST 22. 1991 ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO SPECIFIC PLAINTIFFS. 
It has been stipulated by the parties that the Court's ruling of August 22, 1992 
should apply to those plaintiffs listed in paragraph 9 of plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion, constituting plaintiffs' numbered 1 through 22, and the Court so rules. Defendants 
however suggest an exception to plaintiff number 19, "Paul Taylor", on the grounds that his 
LRA was non-transfen-able. It appears clear from a reading of Mr. Taylor's LRA that it is 
indeed transfenable, and therefore includes Mr. Taylor in the first group of 22 for which the 
MINUTE ENTRY 
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Eourt grants summary judgment. Defendants also suggest an exception for plaintiff number 3 
Elmer Burger on the basis that said plaintiff signed a release in 1987 which purported to 
completely resolve all claims between the parties. The Court agrees and finds that there are fact 
issues regarding plaintiff number 3 Elmer Burger. 
As to the second set of plaintiffs listed in paragraph 10 of plaintiffs' Memorandum 
defendants have raised the defense of lack of consideration. The Court has reviewed all of the 
matters submitted in connection with this argument, particularly the affidavits of Mr. William 
Blair and Mr. Al Kofoed, together with the agreements which recite the receipt of consideration 
and the Court is of the opinion that the record establishes the payment of consideration for said 
plaintiffs and that defendants have failed to establish any facts which create a genuine issue of 
fact as to consideration. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion as to those plaintiffs listed 
in paragraph 10 of plaintiffs's memo. 
Defendants have also raised the issue of the "non-transferabilityM of memberships as to 
plaintiffs 23, 42 and 43, and claimed that those memberships which are not transferable do not 
come within the Court's ruling of August 22, 1991. The Court is of the opinion that an 
easement in gross may indeed be non-transferrable. Particularly where an easement is of a 
personal nature as is somewhat the case here, a non-transferable clause would not defeat the 
easement. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs number 31 and 36 do not have properly signed 
LRA's. It appears to the Court however that said LRA's have been signed and there has been 
no facts developed on this record to show that the signatures were not authorized by the 
partnership. Lastly, as to this second group of plaintiffs defendants claim that plaintiffs 29, 46 
and 47 signed membership disclosure statements providing that the memberships were linked to 
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the ownership of the golf course by the Jeremy Ltd.. The Court feels that this raises a fact issue 
as to whether or not their memberships were limited by these disclosure statements and as to 
these plaintiffs will deny the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The next group of plaintiffs, listed in paragraph 14 of plaintiffs' memo received a lot in 
lieu of a cash refund. Defendants argue that these plaintiffs lost their membership when they 
received the lot in lieu of a refund. While Mr. Blair's affidavit seems to suggest otherwise, 
nevertheless there are some statements made by Mr. Blair in other documents which could be 
viewed as contradicting the affidavits and therefore the Court feels that there is a fact issue as 
to these plaintiffs and will therefore deny the Motion. 
2. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
The Court has reviewed the memos filed in connection with the Motion for 
Reconsideration. It appears that no new evidence has been submitted to the Court and that this 
is primarily a re-argument of the legal principals involved, with the possible exception of the 
new issue raised by defendants, that being the argument that the contracts are void for lack of 
mutuality. As to the issue of the lack of mutuality the Court notes that in the LRA's in this case 
the sole consideration for the contract was not the mutual promises of the parties. Under the 
terms of the LRA other consideration was acknowledged including the $5,000.00 payment. 
In it's Motion to Reconsider the defendants also raised the issue of lack of notice on the 
part of the defendants. Defendants admit that VBF received a sample LRA and a list of 
purchasers prior to the loan closing. But they claim that it was not explained to them that the 
LRA constituted an easement. The Court is of the opinion that sufficient notice occurred when 
the sample LRA and list of purchasers was supplied to the defendants. 
GREENHALGH V. VIRGINIA BEACH PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
Accordingly, defendants' Motion to Reconsider is denied. 
3. MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING 
PERPETUAL NATURE OF FOUNDER MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS AND 
EASEMENTS. 
The Court is of the opinion that the language in the Lot Reservation Agreement 
regarding "life time family memberships" which are "transferrable" is ambiguous. The Court 
finds that the evidence is uncontroverted that the intent of the parties to these agreements in 
those circumstances was that the rights to use the golf course are peipetual. However, those 
memberships which are "life time" memberships and "non-transferrable" do not present an 
ambiguity. While the non-transferrable language does not defeat the basic instrument, 
nevertheless it helps to define the duration of the easement and the Court is of the opinion that 
a life time non-transferrable membership is not transferrable but is limited by the life time of 
the grantee. Those LRA's which contain "life time" and also "perpetual" language are also in 
the opinion of the Court ambiguous. The Court finds as to these that the entire record is 
uncontroverted that the intent of the parties was that those memberships would be peipetual. 
4. DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ATTQKNHEV PTIENT 
DOCUMENTS. 
As to defendants' Motion in Limine the Court is of the opinion that a former 
employee or officer of a corporation cannot waive the attorney client privilege for the 
corporation. The defendants point to the case of Gold Standard v. American Resources. 805 
P2d 164 (Utah 1990). While that case did not involve the attorney client privilege but rather 
the work product doctrine, nevertheless, the Court agrees with defendants that these attorney 
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client communication should be protected. The Court is of the opinion that the intent of the 
holder of the privUege must be given substantial effect. The Court is of the opinion that much 
mischief could occur as a result of a rule which allows an adversary to avoid the attorney client 
privilege if he is able to obtain documents from his opponent by stealth, deceit or some other 
subterfuge. The Court does not in any way suggest that is what occurred in this case but merely 
uses that to underscore it's opinion that the intent of the parties while perhaps not controlling 
in every case must be given substantial consideration. 
Accordingly, defendants1 Motion in Limine is granted. 
5. COUNT I ALTER EGO AND COUNT VI LENDER UABIUTY. 
As to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and VI plaintiffs 
state that they are making claims only for the conduct of the Jeremy Service Corporation 
subsequent to the time that it was substituted as general partner for Jeremy Ltd.. With that 
understanding the Court is of the opinion that there are fact issues to be resolved by the trier of 
fact regarding claims of alter ego in Count I and the claims contained in Count VI. 
6. COUNT Vn FIDUCIARY DUTY AND COUNT VII THIRD PARTY 
BENEFICIARY CLAIMS. 
The Court is of the opinion that this record fails to establish any basis for a claim 
by these plaintiffs against the defendants on the basis of a fiduciary duty owed by defendants to 
plaintiffs or on the basis of plaintiffs being third party beneficiaries to contracts entered into by 
defendants. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants' Motion as to these counts. 
BREENHALGH V. VIRGINIA BEACH 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this f\2> day of January, 1993 
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Wallace HIGH, Richard Atchison, Charles L. 
Milbrandt and Robert Lovell, 
Appellants, 
v, 
Luther DAVIS and Helen E. Davis, husband and 
wife, Skyline Enterprises, Inc., 
Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., and Cascade 
Aviation, Inc., Respondents. 
The LOMAS & NETTLETON COMPANY, a 
Connecticut Corporation, Respondent, 
v. 
SKYLINE ENTERPRISES, INC., an Oregon 
Corporation, et al., Defendants, 
Wallace E. High, Richard G. Atchison, Charles 
L. Milbrandt, Robert S. Lovell, 
Floyd Thomas Morrell, James McFarland and 
Deane Stearns, Appellants. 
TC 3636, TC 3630; SCP-2486. 
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc. 
Argued and Submitted June 5, 1978. 
Decided Sept. 12, 1978. 
A suit for declaratory judgment that claimants 
were entitled to exclusive and perpetual hunting, 
fishing and recreational rights on certain real 
property and a suit by a mortgagee to foreclose 
mortgages on such real property were consolidated 
on appeal after the Circuit Court, Sherman County, 
John A. Jelderks, J., held that the documents 
purporting to convey the hunting and fishing 
privileges did not adequately describe the property 
or give claimants an interest in the property superior 
to the mortgages. The Supreme Court, Tongue, J., 
upon de novo review of the evidence, held that: (1) 
where it could be ascertained from description of 
land in membership agreements and from evidence 
other than writings and without necessity of 
considering testimony by parties to the agreements 
about their intentions or negotiations, that one 
specific piece of property, described in a land sale 
contract was the only property to which the 
membership agreements could apply, purposes of 
statute of frauds were satisfied and membership 
agreements were specific enough to be enforceable, 
and (2) the corporation by reason of a preliminary 
title report from a title company was charged with 
notice of facts that would have been discovered by 
inquiry, and its security interest had no priority over 
Copr.® West 1994 No claim 
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interests of claimants. 
Case remanded for modification of foreclosure 
decree to provide that, except for one claimant who 
had quitclaimed, claimants had interests superior to 
that of mortgagee. 
Lent, J., filed a specially concurring opinion. 
[1] HUSBAND AND WIFE <®=> 17 
205kl7 
It was not necessary that wife of fee simple owner of 
property join in land sale contract. 
[2] CONTRACTS <§=> 175(1) 
95kl75(l) 
Under statute providing for conclusive presumption, 
between parties, of truth of recitals in written 
instrument, company and its successors in interest 
were bound by recital, in membership agreements to 
which company was party, that company owned 
specified property. ORS 41.350(3). 
[3] ESTOPPEL <&=* 78(3) 
156k78(3) 
Company having been party to membership 
agreements in which it was recited that company 
owned specified property, company, later taking 
interest by assignment, was estopped to deny its 
power to convey interests in the land to the 
membership subscribers, and company's successors 
in interest were similarly estopped. 
[3] ESTOPPEL <©=> 98(1) 
156k98(l) 
Company having been party to membership 
agreements in which it was recited that company 
owned specified property, company, later taking 
interest by assignment, was estopped to deny its 
power to convey interests in the land to the 
membership subscribers, and company's successors 
in interest were similarly estopped. 
[4] CORPORATIONS <®=* 617(2) 
101k617(2) 
Where corporation, after reinstatement by 
corporation commissioner, assigned vendee's 
interest in land sale contract, such action was 
ratification by corporation of acceptance on its 
behalf of benefits of contract while corporation was 
dissolved. ORS 57.630(2). 
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[5] LICENSES <&* 43 
238k43 
Claimed right to hunting, fishing and recreational 
rights, based upon membership agreements, could 
be classified as "profit a prendre."~ 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[6] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <S=* 61 
185k61 
Element of participation in soil and its produce 
distinguishes profit from easement; grant of "profit 
a prendre" is grant of interest in land itself, and is 
within statute of frauds. ORS 41.580. 
[6] LICENSES <S^ 44(3) 
238k44(3) 
Element of participation in soil and its produce 
distinguishes profit from easement; grant of "profit 
a prendre" is grant of interest in land itself, and is 
within statute of frauds. ORS 41.580. 
[7] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <®^  110(1) 
185kll0(l) 
Real issue, when sufficiency of description of land 
in contract subject to statute of frauds is challenged, 
is whether written description, in light of 
ascertainable objective facts and without resort to 
evidence of parties' intentions or oral discussions of 
transaction, can be said with reasonable certainty to 
apply only to one specific, identifiable piece of 
property, in which case writing is sufficient under 
statute of frauds although complete description of 
property may have to be obtained from other 
sources. ORS 41.580. 
[8] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <&* 110(1) 
185kll0(l) 
If extrinsic evidence discloses that written 
description can, with equal accuracy, apply to more 
than one piece of property, writing will be held 
insufficient, and parol evidence will not be 
permitted to explain which of possible properties the 
parties intended to describe. ORS 41.580. 
[8] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <3=> 158(3) 
185kl58(3) 
If extrinsic evidence discloses that written 
description can, with equal accuracy, apply to more 
than one piece of property, writing will be held 
insufficient, and parol evidence will not be 
permitted to explain which of possible properties the 
parties intended to describe. ORS 41.580. 
[9] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <§=> 110(1) 
185kll0(l) 
Where it appears from description of land itself, 
without need to consider extrinsic evidence, that 
description could apply to more than one piece of 
property, and it is apparent from face of writing that 
ambiguity cannot be cured without resort to parol 
evidence of parties' intentions, writing is held 
unenforceable under statute of frauds. ORS 41.580. 
[10] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <&* 110(1) 
185kll0(l) 
Where it could be ascertained from description of 
land in membership agreements and from evidence 
other than writings and without necessity of 
considering testimony by parties to the agreements 
about their intentions or negotiations that specific 
piece of property, described in land sale contract, 
was only property to which membership agreements 
could apply, purposes of statute of frauds were 
satisfied and membership agreements were specific 
enough to be enforceable. ORS 41.580. 
[11] DEEDS <®^  60 
120k60 
To be effective, delivery of deed must be 
unconditional or any conditions must be satisfied. 
[12] EVIDENCE <S=> 420(1) 
157k420(l) 
Parol evidence is admissible to determine whether in 
fact there has been valid delivery of deed, but parol 
evidence is not admissible to show that deed which 
has been executed and delivered is subject to a 
condition not appearing on face of the deed. ORS 
41.580. 
[12] EVIDENCE <&= 431 
157k431 
Parol evidence is admissible to determine whether in 
fact there has been valid delivery of deed, but parol 
evidence is not admissible to show that deed which 
has been executed and delivered is subject to a 
condition not appearing on face of the deed. ORS 
41.580. 
[13] DEEDS <§=* 121 
120kl21 
Execution and delivery of quitclaim deed precluded 
grantor from thereafter asserting rights under prior 
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membership agreement, despite contention that deed 
was executed and delivered to remove cloud on title 
and on condition that it would be binding only if 
grantee executed another agreement. ORS 41.580. 
[14] EVIDENCE <S^ 161.1 
157kl61.1 
Formerly 157kl61(l) 
Oral testimony of writing and contents is normally 
precluded by best evidence rule until party shows 
that he could not produce original writing in 
reasonable time by exercise of reasonable effort to 
do so. ORS 41.640. 
[14] EVIDENCE <S^ 181 
157kl81 
Oral testimony of writing and contents is normally 
precluded by best evidence rule until party shows 
that he could not produce original writing in 
reasonable time by exercise of reasonable effort to 
do so. ORS 41.640. 
[15] APPEAL AND ERROR <&* 1051(6) 
30kl051(6) 
Technically speaking, trial court should not have 
admitted secondary evidence before determining 
extent of diligence in searching for missing 
document, but in view of evidence overwhelmingly 
pointing to fact that missing agreement was identical 
in form and content to all others involved in case, 
any error in introduction of the secondary evidence 
was harmless. ORS 41.640. 
[15] EVIDENCE <S=* 187 
157kl87 
Technically speaking, trial court should not have 
admitted secondary evidence before determining 
extent of diligence in searching for missing 
document, but in view of evidence overwhelmingly 
pointing to fact that missing agreement was identical 
in form and content to all others involved in case, 
any error in introduction of the secondary evidence 
was harmless. ORS 41.640. 
[16] MORTGAGES <&* 154(1) 
266kl54(l) 
Notice that will deprive mortgagee of priority can be 
either actual or constructive; "actual notice" is 
direct knowledge of outstanding interest, while 
"constructive notice" encompasses both notice 
chargeable under recording statute and "inquiry 
notice". ORS 93.710. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[16] MORTGAGES <&=> 154(2) 
266kl54(2) 
Notice that will deprive mortgagee of priority can be 
either actual or constructive; "actual notice" is 
direct knowledge of outstanding interest, while 
"constructive notice" encompasses both notice 
chargeable under recording statute and "inquiry 
notice". ORS 93.710. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[17] MORTGAGES <©=> 154(4) 
266kl54(4) 
Mortgagee was not charged with record notice 
where membership agreements granting rights to 
hunt, fish, etc., on real property had not been 
properly acknowledged before recordation. ORS 
93.480. 
[18] MORTGAGES <®^  154(2) 
266kl54(2) 
Corporation having received preliminary title report 
from title company listing certain exceptions 
including right, title and interest of holders of 
memberships in development company, and 
corporation having failed to make inquiry of 
company or members asserting hunting and fishing 
rights to determine extent of interest claimed, 
corporation was charged with notice of facts that 
would have been discovered by such inquiry, and its 
security interest had no priority over interests of 
such claimants. ORS 93.480. 
[19] SECURITIES REGULATION <&* 300 
349Bk300 
Whether or not sale of membership agreements 
constituted sales of securities, corporation which had 
not been party to alleged illegal transaction had no 
standing to claim invalidity of sales under statute. 
ORS 59.250, Laws 1963, c. 244. 
[20] EQUITY <&=> 65(1) 
150k65(l) 
Where there was no evidence of any intentional or 
knowing violation of securities law, if there was 
one, claimants of hunting and fishing rights did not 
have "unclean hands" precluding relief to them, and, 
where claimants were receiving only what they had 
bargained and paid for, there was no unjust 
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enrichment. Summary of facts. 
[21] MORTGAGES <@=> 17 
266kl7 
It is possible for mortgagee to be subrogated to 
rights of prior lienor, but principles which permit 
subrogation in such cases are equitable. 
[22] MORTGAGES <&* 17 
266kl7 
Where mortgagee had notice of existence of 
membership agreements creating hunting and fishing 
rights and chose to proceed with mortgage 
transaction without further investigation, there were 
insufficient equities in its favor to entitle it to be 
subrogated to rights of prior lienors whose liens had 
been discharged out of mortgage proceeds, thus to 
foreclose such hunting and fishing rights. 
*316 **727 Brad Littlefield, of Goldsmith, 
Siegel, Engel & Littlefield, Portland, argued the 
cause and filed the briefs for appellants. 
Gile R. Downes, of Jensen, DeFrancq, Holmes & 
Schulte, Portland, argued the cause for respondents 
The Lomas & Nettleton Co. and Lomas and 
Nettleton Financial Corp. With him on the brief 
was Ted Jensen, of Jensen, DeFrancq, Holmes & 
Schulte, Portland. 
These suits involve the assertion by the claimants 
of hunting, fishing and recreational rights on 
property known as the Luther Davis Ranch, a large 
body of land located in Wasco, Sherman and 
Gilliam Counties. Davis was interested in 
developing the property for an exclusive hunting and 
fishing club. As part of his overall plan he sold the 
property by land sale contract to Devsal, Inc., which 
was to proceed with the sale of memberships in the 
development. The contract also contemplated that 
the "operation" would be transferred to the John 
Day Recreational and Development Corporation 
(JDRDC) which would promote and sell 
memberships. It was also agreed that Davis would 
execute documents granting the purchasers of 
memberships the exclusive right to hunt, fish and 
use the property in perpetuity and that these 
documents would be separately recorded as 
encumbrances on the property. Before JDRDC 
actually sold the membership *318 agreements 
various amendments were made to the land sale 
contract to facilitate the development of the property 
and the sale of memberships. Devsal later assigned 
its interest in the land sale contract to JDRDC, but 
this took place after the execution of all of the 
membership agreements which are at issue in this 
case. [FN 1] 
TONGUE, Justice. 
These two suits were consolidated on appeal 
because of the identity of issues raised. In the first 
case filed Wallace High and others (hereinafter 
"claimants") sought a declaratory judgment that they 
were entitled to exclusive and perpetual hunting, 
fishing and recreational rights on certain real 
property formerly owned by Luther Davis and that 
their rights were superior to the rights of Lomas & 
Nettleton. The second case was a suit by Lomas & 
Nettleton to foreclose the two mortgages it had on 
that real property. 
FN1. See p. —. The chronology of these and 
other relevant transactions, according to the 
record, is as follows: 
The trial court held that although Lomas & 
Nettleton had some knowledge that there might be 
claimed rights to hunting and fishing privileges, the 
documents purporting to convey the interests did not 
adequately **728 describe the property and did not 
give claimants an interest in the property superior to 
the mortgages. Upon de novo review of the 
evidence we reverse the decree of the trial court. 
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DATE 
netime prior to 
Sept. 13, 1956. 
oruary 16, 1965 
ptember 7, 1965 
ptember 14, 1965 
ptember 30, 1965 
tober 21, 1965 
tober 28, 1965 
cember 1, 1965. 
cember 5, 1965. 
cember 13, 1965. 
nuary 23, 1967. 
tober 5, 1967. 
.ne 13, 1968. 
,gust 14, 1968. 
Lgust 19, 1968 
tgust 19, 1968. 
*318, 584 P.2d 725, **728) 
TRANSACTION 
Land sale contract between Davis 
and Devsal. 
Agreement between Devsal and 
JDRDC that Devsal would transfer 
interest in ranch in exchange for 51 
percent of JDRDC capital stock. 
Membership agreement of Wallace 
High. 
Amendment to land sale contract. 
Membership agreement of Charles 
Milbrandt. 
Modification of land sale contract, 
Membership agreement of Robert 
S. Lovell. 
Membership agreement of Richard 
G. Atchison. 
Membership agreement of Floyd T. 
Morrell. 
Membership agreement of James 
McFarlan. 
Devsal involuntarily dissolved by 
corporation commissioner. 
Morrell membership agreement 
recorded 
Land sale contract recorded; High, 
Milbrandt, Atchison membership 
agreements recorded. 
JDRDC dissolved by corporation 
commissioner. 
Assignment by Devsal of vendee's 
interest in land sale contract to 
JDRDC. 
Quitclaim deeds whereby Devsal 
conveyed to JDRDC property in 
Sherman and Gilliam Counties. 
Page 5 
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August 19 , 1968 
January 2 1 , 1970 
) c t o b e r 1970 . 
lovember 14, 1970. 
August 31, 1971. 
September 9, 1971. 
September 27, 1971, 
December 3, 1971. 
October 15, 1973. 
Release by Devsal and JDRDC of 
obligations under agreement of 
February 16, 1965. 
JDRDC reinstated by corporation 
commissioner. 
Assignment to Davis by JDRDC of 
vendee's interest in land sale 
contract. 
Quitclaim deed executed by 
Wallace High releasing to Davis High's 
interest in his membership 
agreement. 
Warranty deed from Davis to 
Skyline Enterprises, Inc. 
Mortgage from Skyline Enterprises, 
Inc., to Lomas & Nettleton 
Financial Corp. to secure promissory 
note of $700,000. 
Mortgage from Skyline Enterprises, 
Inc., to Lomas & Nettleton 
Financial Corp. to secure promissory 
note of $350,000. 
Lovell membership agreement 
recorded. 
Assignment of mortgages from 
Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp. to 
Lomas & Nettleton Co. 
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*319 Apparently the development never got off 
the ground, although a small number of 
memberships had been sold. Eventually the vendee's 
interest in the land sale contract was assigned back 
to Davis. Davis subsequently conveyed the property 
to Skyline, Inc., which borrowed the money and 
issued the mortgages that are the subject of the 
foreclosure suit. 
[1] As previously noted, the trial court held that 
although Lomas & Nettleton may have had notice or 
knowledge of the membership **729 agreements, 
that notice or knowledge, even coupled with the 
other information available to Lomas & Nettleton, 
was not sufficient "to create a permanent interest in 
land which would have priority over a subsequent 
purchaser or mortgage." The trial court held that it 
did not need to reach the question whether the 
membership agreements were valid as between the 
parties to them. We disagree with this approach. In 
our view, the controlling question to be decided in 
this case is whether the membership agreements 
conveyed interests in the land to the claimants. If 
they did then, in our opinion, claimants would have 
priority over all but bona fide purchasers without 
notice of their interests. [FN2] 
FN2. We agree with the finding of the trial 
court that Luther Davis was the fee simple 
owner of the property and that it was not 
necessary for his wife to join in the land sale 
contract to Devsal. Consequently, Mrs. Davis' 
failure to sign the amendments to the contract 
has no bearing on the validity of Devsal's 
assignment of the vendee's interest to JDRDC. 
*320 The validity of the membership agreements. 
A. JDRDC could convey the hunting and fishing 
rights to the Luther Davis ranch. 
Lomas & Nettleton contends the claimants could 
not have acquired any rights because during the 
period in which the membership agreements were 
executed, September to December 1965, JDRDC 
had no interest in the property and that its 
subsequent acquisition was null and void. 
The record reveals that between September and 
December 1965, when the membership agreements 
were executed, Luther Davis had the vendor's 
interest (legal title) and Devsal had the vendee's 
interest (equitable title). It was not until August 19, 
1968, that Devsal assigned its vendee's interest to 
JDRDC. In other words, notwithstanding the recital 
in the membership agreements that "John Day 
Recreational Development Company is the owner of 
a large body of land," JDRDC in fact had no 
interest in the land at that time. 
[2] [3] Lomas & Nettleton's contention overlooks 
the fact that ORS 41.350(3) conclusively presumes, 
between the parties, the truth of the recitals in a 
written instrument. It follows that JDRDC and its 
successors in interest, including Lomas & Nettleton, 
are bound by the recital that JDRDC owned the 
property. Cf. Emmons et al. v. Sanders et al., 217 
Or. 234, 241, 342 P.2d 125 (1959).[FN3] 
FN3. The same result follows under familiar 
equitable principles. Devsal assigned its 
vendee's interest to JDRDC on August 19, 
1968. JDRDC would, therefore, be estopped to 
deny its power to convey interests in the land to 
the membership subscribers. Cf. Taggart v. 
Risley, 4 Or. 235, 241 (1872). See also 2 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 865, s 658 (5th 
ed 1941); 4 Tiffany, Law of Real Property 
1103, s 1230 (3d ed 1975). JDRDC's 
successors in interest are similarly estopped. 
Taggart v. Risley, supra. 
[4] However, a further complication is introduced 
in this case. On January 23, 1967, Devsal was 
involuntarily dissolved by the corporation 
commissioner and on August 14, 1968, JDRDC was 
involuntarily dissolved. It was later reinstated, but 
on August 19, when *321 Devsal assigned its 
vendee's interest to JDRDC, neither corporation was 
in legal existence. 
ORS 57.630(2) provides: 
"Whenever any such corporation is the owner of 
real or personal property, or claims any interest or 
lien whatsoever in any real or personal property, 
such corporation shall continue to exist during 
such five-year period for the purpose of 
conveying, transferring and releasing such real or 
personal property or interest or lien therein, * * 
Thus, Devsal was able to convey its vendee's 
interest even after its dissolution. However, Lomas 
& Nettleton contends that JDRDC could not accept 
the conveyance while it was involuntarily dissolved, 
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citing Klorfine v. Cole, 121 Or. 76, 82, 85, 252 P. 
708, 254 P. 200 (1927). This court held in that case 
that a purported conveyance to a dissolved 
corporation was a nullity because the corporation 
was "civilly dead." The question in the instant case 
is whether **730 JDRDC's reinstatement by the 
corporation commissioner on January 21, 1970, 
validated transactions made during the period of 
suspension. 
There is a split of authority on the question 
whether reinstatement of a repealed corporate 
charter validates all acts of the corporation in the 
interim period of suspension. See Annot., 13 
A.L.R.2d 1220 (1950). While some states hold that 
reinstatement "relates back" to the time of repeal, 
this court has held that reinstatement does not cancel 
the dissolution Ab initio, Lents, Inc. v. Borstad, 
251 Or. 296, 299, 445 P.2d 597 (1968). The 
opinion in that case notes, however, that the court 
was not there concerned with the validation of 
corporate acts between dissolution and 
reinstatement. In Gillen-Cole Co. v. Fox & Co., 
146 Or. 208, 224, 29 P.2d 1019 (1934), this court 
held that a reinstated corporation ratified what had 
been done on its behalf during the period of 
suspension. [FN4] JDRDC, after reinstatement, 
assigned the vendee's interest in the land sale 
contract back to Davis. This action, in our *322 
opinion, was ratification by JDRDC of the 
acceptance on its behalf of the benefits of the 
contract while the corporation was dissolved. 
FN4. Cf. Deschutes Co. v. Lara et al., 127 Or. 
57, 73, 270 P. 913 (1928). 
B. The membership agreements did not violate the 
Statute of Frauds. 
[5] [6] Claimants' purported interest in the 
property based upon their membership agreements 
can be classified as a "profit a prendre." In Bingham 
v. Salene, 15 Or. 208, 214, 14 P. 523 (1887), this 
court stated that the right to take something from the 
land of another, including hunting and fishing, is a 
"profit a prendre." The element of participation in 
the soil and its produce distinguishes a profit from 
an easement. A grant of a profit a prendre is a grant 
of an interest in the land itself, and within the statute 
of frauds. Id. at 212-13, 14 P. 523. See also 
Hahner, An Analysis of Profits A Prendre, 25 
Or.L.Rev. 217, 218, 233 (1946). 
The parties both recognize that the central issue in 
these cases is the adequacy of the property 
description in the membership agreements to satisfy 
the statute of frauds, ORS 41.580.[FN5] Claimants 
also contend that Lomas & Nettleton is a "stranger" 
to these agreements and is precluded from raising 
the statute of frauds. This contention may well have 
merit. See Ringler v. Ruby, 117 Or. 455, 244 P. 
509 (1926), and City of Medford v. Bessonette, 255 
Or. 53, 58, 463 P.2d 865 (1970). We need not 
decide that question, however, because we find the 
property description to be adequate, for reasons 
which we shall now discuss. 
FN5. ORS 41.580 provides: "In the following 
cases the agreement is void unless it, or some 
note of memorandum thereof, expressing the 
consideration, is in writing and subscribed by 
the party to be charged, or by his lawfully 
authorized agent; evidence, therefore, of the 
agreement shall not be received other than the 
writing, or secondary evidence of its contents 
in the cases prescribed by law: " * * *sha "(5) 
An agreement for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale of real 
property, or of any interest therein." 
It is conceded that the location of the land and its 
description cannot be determined from the 
membership *323 agreements alone. Lomas & 
Nettleton argues that the description in the 
agreements is patently ambiguous and that, for this 
reason, no extrinsic evidence can be admitted to 
identify the property covered by the agreements, 
citing Hertel v. Woodard, 183 Or. 99, 191 P.2d 400 
(1948); Bingham v. Honeyman, 32 Or. 129, 51 P. 
735 (1898); Noyes v. Stauff, 5 Or. 455 (1875). 
Although this court has, in the past, sometimes 
used the terms "latent" and "patent" in deciding 
when an ambiguity in a land description can be 
explained by extrinsic evidence, our recent decisions 
have avoided the use of those terms, and with good 
reason. They are misleading, in our opinion, as is 
the suggested conclusion that extrinsic evidence will 
be freely admitted in the one instance but not in the 
other. [FN6] 
FN6. The purported rule has been described as 
a thoroughly discredited misunderstanding of a 
maxim laid down by Sir Francis Bacon. See 
McBaine, The Rule Against Disturbing Plain 
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Meaning of Writings, 31 Calif.L.Rev. 145, 
147 (1943). 
**731 [7] When the results of our prior cases are 
examined, it is apparent that the real issue, when the 
sufficiency of the description of land in a contract 
subject to the statute of frauds is challenged, is 
whether the written description, in light of the 
ascertainable objective facts and without resort to 
evidence of the parties' intentions or oral 
discussions of the transaction, can be said with 
reasonable certainty to apply only to one specific, 
identifiable, piece of property. If so, the writing is 
sufficient under the statute of frauds, although a 
complete description of the property may have to be 
obtained from other sources. For example, in 
Kallstrom v. O'Callaghan, 259 Or. 210, 485 P.2d 
1200 (1971), the writing (after reformation to 
correct a conceded error) described the property as 
Mthe approx. 2 acre parcel located directly North and 
contiguous to 19705 S.W. Boones Ferry Rd. 
Tualatin, Oregon." Extrinsic evidence showed that 
there was only one parcel of land, consisting of two 
acres, directly north of and contiguous to the 
address given. And in Burns v. Witter, 56 Or. 368, 
108 P. 129 (1910), the property was *324 described 
in the writing as "my farm containing 40 acres." 
The memorandum did not mention the location of 
the property, or state where the agreement was 
executed. The court held that if the proof showed 
that the sellers only owned one farm, and that that 
farm consisted of 40 acres, the writing was 
sufficiently definite for enforcement. See also 
Phillips v. Johnson, 266 Or. 544, 514 P.2d 1337 
(1973); Sherwood v. Gerking, 209 Or. 493, 306 
P.2d 386 (1957) (broker's contract); Wurzweiler v. 
Cox, 138 Or. 110, 5 P.2d 699 (1931); Bloech v. 
Hyland Homes Co. et al., 119 Or. 297, 247 P. 761 
(1926); Flegel v. Dowling, 54 Or. 40, 102 P. 178 
(1909); Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or. 121, 96 P. 673 
(1908); House v. Jackson, 24 Or. 89, 32 P. 1027 
(1893). But see Hughes v. Evans, 64 Or. 368, 130 
P. 639 (1913) (result disapproved in Sherwood v. 
Gerking, supra). 
[8] If, on the other hand, extrinsic evidence 
discloses that a written description can, with equal 
accuracy, apply to more than one piece of property, 
the writing will be held insufficient, and parol 
evidence will not be permitted to explain which of 
the possible properties the parties intended to 
describe. In such a case the statute of frauds serves 
its intended function by preventing the enforcement 
of an agreement when the subject matter of the 
writing can be ascertained only by parol evidence of 
the parties' agreement. ORS 41.580 forbids 
evidence, other than the writing, "of the 
agreement." See n.5, Supra. 
For example, in Meadowlark Inv. Corp. v. 
Croeni, 237 Or. 535, 392 P.2d 327, 328 (1964), the 
description in the writing (at 537) was: 
"Residence and property belonging to Susan 
Lehman located at 3805 N.W. Saltzman Road 
Portland 10, Oreg. Said property consists of 
approx. 39 acres and fronts on two sides of N.W. 
Thompson Road and one side by Saltzman Road. 
$ afe jje »• 
On its face this description appears to be more 
specific than many others which have been held 
enforceable. Extrinsic evidence, however, showed 
that the seller's property contained more than 46 
acres, and that both *325 the street address and the 
road frontage references in the writing applied to the 
entire parcel. Therefore the description in the 
writing did not provide any way to determine which 
39 acres out of the 46 or more described was the 
subject of the agreement. Parol evidence was not 
admissible to show which 39 acres the parties 
actually intended. To admit such evidence would 
have been to admit evidence other than the writing 
of the agreement itself. The agreement was held 
unenforceable. For similar decisions holding 
writings unenforceable after considering evidence or 
allegations which showed that the description in the 
writing could be applied, with equal accuracy, to 
more than one piece of land, See Hink et ux v. 
Bowlsby et al., 199 Or. **732 238, 260 P.2d 1091 
(1953); Trumbly et al. v. Fixley, 178 Or. 458, 168 
P.2d 571 (1946); Woolsey v. Draper et al., 103 Or. 
103, 201 P. 730, 203 P. 582 (1921). 
In all of the above cases, whether the writing was 
ultimately held enforceable or unenforceable, 
extrinsic evidence was examined or held admissible 
in order to determine whether the description in the 
writing, when read in light of known facts about the 
parties and the property purportedly covered, was 
fatally ambiguous. In none of them was parol 
evidence of the parties' understanding or oral 
agreement allowed to cure such an ambiguity if 
extrinsic evidence showed it to exist. 
[9] Sometimes it may appear from the description 
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itself, without the need to consider extrinsic 
evidence, that the description could apply to more 
than one piece of property. See, for example, Coast 
Brokers v. Hickman, 239 Or. 121, 396 P.2d 756 
(1964) ("two tracts of land one of 5 acres and one of 
7 acres adjoining Honey man park south of 
Florence."); Hertel v. Woodard, 183 Or. 99, 191 
P.2d 400 (1948) ("lot and house number 960 Union 
Street" but no indication of city, county, or state, or 
that seller presently owned the lot and house to be 
conveyed); Noyes v. Stauff, 5 Or. 455 (1875) 
("house which is to be in construction"). See also 
Hyland v. Oregon Agricultural Co., I l l Or. 212, 
*326 225 P. 728 (1924); Bingham v. Honeyman, 32 
Or. 129, 51 P. 735, 52 P. 755 (1898); Whiteaker v. 
Vanschoiack, 5 Or. 113 (1873). In these cases, 
because it is apparent from the face of the writing 
that the ambiguity cannot be cured without resort to 
parol evidence of the parties' intentions, the writing 
is held unenforceable. 
To summarize, if it is clear from the face of the 
writing that the description could apply with equal 
accuracy to more than one piece of property, it is 
unenforceable by reason of that fact. If the written 
description might possibly apply to but one piece of 
land, evidence is admissible to determine whether 
there is only one, or more than one, to which it 
might apply. If it can be determined with 
reasonable certainty that there is only one, the 
written description is sufficiently definite to meet 
the requirements of the statute of frauds although the 
complete description must be supplied from other 
sources. If, however, the extrinsic evidence 
demonstrates that there is more than one piece of 
property to which the description in the writing can 
accurately apply the description is ambiguous and 
the writing will be held insufficient. This is 
essentially what this court said in Burns v. Witter, 
56 Or. 368, 371, 108 P. 129, 130 (1910): 
"If, on its face, the memorandum contain such a 
specification of real property that by the aid of 
parol testimony the description given can apply to 
only one particular tract of land, it is sufficient; 
but if it appear, from extrinsic evidence, that the 
delineation set forth can refer to more than one 
parcel, the ambiguity is patent and the instrument 
void for uncertainty * * *." [FN7] 
FN7. The textwriters on real property 
transactions do not discuss the problem of the 
sufficiency of land descriptions or the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the terms 
we have employed here. We have reexamined 
the results of our cases and described what we 
have done because we find the traditional 
treatment of these questions not particularly 
helpful. See, for example, 4 Tiffany, Real 
Property 229, s 997 (3d ed 1975): "In all 
instruments for conveyance of land, the 
description thereof must be sufficiently definite 
and certain upon the face of instrument itself, 
or in some other writing referred to, that the 
land can be identified with reasonably 
certainty; otherwise the instrument is void 
under the Statute of Frauds. Generally, 
however, a written description suffices to 
satisfy the statute if it is sufficiently definite, 
with the aid of extrinsic evidence, to identify 
the land sought to be described. Under the rule 
a latent but not a patent ambiguity may be 
resolved by extrinsic evidence." (Footnotes 
omitted) See also 6 Thompson on Real Property 
462-67, ss 3025, 3026 (1962); 3 Casner, 
American Law of Property 19-20, s 11.5 
(1952). The inconsistent results which the 
traditional rules have produced can be seen in 
the cases collected in Annot., Sufficiency of 
Description or Designation of Land in Contract 
or Memorandum of Sale, under State of 
Frauds, 23 A.L.R.2d 6 (1952). Professor 
Corbin argues for a liberal approach to testing 
the adequacy of the description, and does not 
make it clear whether he would or would not 
allow evidence of the parties' oral agreements 
or their understanding of the transaction itself. 
2 Corbin on Contracts 718-19, s 505 (1950). 
As we have indicated, we have found sufficient 
guidance in the results of our prior cases for the 
decision now before us. The parties have not 
argued, and we need not here consider, whether 
parol evidence of the parties' negotiations or 
intentions should ever be admissible. 
*327 **733 The facts of our cases illustrate some 
of the kinds of extrinsic evidence which can show 
that the writing can apply to only one piece of land. 
If, for example, the writing refers to "my ranch" or 
"his residence" and to the general location, extrinsic 
evidence may show that the seller owns only one 
ranch or residence in that area, and that it conforms 
to other characteristics mentioned in the writing. 
See, e. g., Burns v. Witter, supra; Bogard v. 
Barhan, 52 Or. 121, 96 P. 673 (1908); Cf. 
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Henderson v. Lemke, 60 Or. 363, 119 P. 428 
(1911) (broker's contract). Or the evidence may 
show that there is but one piece of property in the 
area which is described by a distinctive name which 
is employed in the writing. See, e. g., Sherwood v. 
Gerking, 209 Or. 493, 306 P.2d 386 (1957); 
Wurzweiler v. Cox, 138 Or. 110, 5 P.2d 699 
(1931); Bloech v. Hyland Homes Co. et al., 119 Or. 
297, 247 P. 761 (1926); Flegel v. Dowling, 54 Or. 
40, 102 P. 178 (1909); House v. Jackson, 24 Or. 
89, 32 P. 1027 (1893). Recitals in the writing as to 
where the parties reside or where the writing was 
executed can be used as an indication of the general 
area in which the property is located, and may 
combine with extrinsic evidence to show that the 
applicability of an otherwise general description is 
sufficiently limited. *328 See Wurzweiler v. Cox, 
supra; Flegel v. Dowling, supra; Bogard v. Barhan, 
supra. There are, undoubtedly, other kinds of 
extrinsic evidence which can indicate that the 
written description, although general in terms, can 
with reasonable certainty be applied to a given piece 
of property and no other. 
Thus, the problem in this case is to determine 
whether, in light of the available extrinsic evidence 
other than that of the parties' negotiations and 
intentions, the language of the membership 
agreements applies with reasonable certainty to a 
single identifiable piece of property and no other. 
The agreements, all of which are identical in this 
respect, recite that: 
" * * * John Day Recreational Development 
Company is the owner of a large body of land 
consisting of some 18,000 acres owned in fee * * 
* and * * * said land has a frontage upon the John 
Day River and its tributaries approximating 35 
miles, and * * * the John Day Recreational 
Development is developing the said premises for 
an exclusive hunting and fishing club * * *." 
The agreements also contain the additional 
information that "Luther W. Davis, ex ux" are 
"holders in fee," and that the premises are to be 
known and referred to as the "High Country." 
The agreements make no mention of the state or 
general area where the land in question is located. 
The only John Day River in the United States listed 
in standard reference works is in Oregon. [FN8] 
Actually, there are two John Day Rivers in Oregon, 
one in the eastern portion of the state and one in 
Clatsop County.[FN9] Other references in the 
agreements, however, when read in light of the 
extrinsic evidence, make it clear that the reference in 
those agreements is to the well-known John Day 
River in eastern Oregon. 
FN8. The Times Atlas of the World, index at 
26 (Mid-Cent ed 1957); 30 Encyclopedia 
Americana 369 (1957). 
FN9. See McArthur, Oregon Geographic Place 
Names 327 (3d ed 1952). 
*329 The record does not show that JDRDC 
owned any land in the area at the time the 
agreements were executed. There is, however, 
evidence that Luther Davis owned a "large body of 
land" in the John Day River area, with an 
unspecified amount of frontage on the river and its 
tributaries, and that Davis, at that time, believed 
that his wife was a co-owner. 
[10] The reference in the agreements to the Davis 
ownership does not, alone, serve to identify the 
property covered by the **734 writings because 
Davis, either individually or with his wife, owned 
adjoining property, under cultivation, which was not 
being "developed" by JDRDC. However, the 
record does establish the following: Devsal was the 
equitable owner, by virtue of a land sale contract 
containing a complete description, of a portion of 
the Davis property. The contract contemplated a 
transfer to JDRDC, which would promote and sell 
memberships constituting rights in that land. Devsal 
owned and controlled JDRDC. JDRDC was, at the 
time the membership agreements were executed, 
actively promoting memberships in an "exclusive 
hunting and fishing club" with membership rights to 
be exercised on that same land. It was not involved 
in the development or promotion of any other 
hunting and fishing club." 
When all of this evidence is considered together it 
establishes with reasonable certainty, in our opinion, 
that a specific piece of property that described in the 
land sale contract between the Davises and Devsal 
was the only property to which the membership 
agreements could apply.[FN10] It follows, in our 
judgment, *330 that the purposes of the statute of 
frauds were satisfied: the subject matter of the 
membership agreements can be determined from the 
writings and other evidence, without the necessity of 
considering testimony by the parties to those 
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agreements about their intentions or negotiations. 
For these reasons, we hold that the membership 
agreements are specific enough to be enforceable. 
FN 10. There is one difficulty with this 
conclusion which we have not overlooked the 
recital in the membership agreements that the 
property in question consists of "some 18,000 
acres." The property described in the land sale 
contract amounts to slightly more than half that 
number of acres. However, this discrepancy is 
not fatal to the enforceability of the 
agreements. The evidence leaves no doubt that 
the "High Country" area which was being 
promoted by JDRDC was only that described in 
the contract. The extrinsic fact which limits 
the applicability of the membership agreements 
is JDRDCs activity with respect to the land. 
The statement of acreage in those agreements is 
erroneous, but does not create an ambiguity, in 
our opinion. 
C. Not all of the claimants are entitled to the 
recreational rights. 
The trial court noted that there are questions as to 
whether two of the claimants, High and Stearns, are 
entitled to the recreational rights because High 
quitclaimed his interest back to Davis and Stearns 
could not produce his membership agreement at 
trial. 
On November 14, 1970, High executed a 
quitclaim deed whereby he released his right, title 
and interest in his membership agreement to Luther 
Davis.[FN 11] High concedes that this deed was 
delivered to Davis but contends that the deed was 
executed and delivered at Davis' request to remove a 
cloud on his title and on the condition that it would 
be binding only if Davis executed another agreement 
permitting the members to hunt and fish on the 
property and only if all of the other members would 
sign similar quitclaim deeds. 
FN11. There is insufficient evidence to support 
Lomas & Nettleton's contention that "similar 
quitclaim deeds were executed and delivered by 
each of High et al. except Richard Atchison." 
[11] [12] [13] There is a critical distinction between 
a conditional delivery of a deed and a conditional 
conveyance. To be effective a delivery must be 
unconditional or any conditions must be satisfied. 
Parol evidence is admissible to determine whether in 
fact there has been a valid delivery. See Putnam et 
ux v. Jenkins et ux, 204 Or. 691, 724-25, 285 P.2d 
532 (1955); Lancaster v. May, *331 as 
Administrator, 194 Or. 647, 654, 243 P.2d 268 
(1952). See also 26 C.J.S. Deeds s 48 (1956). 
However, it is a general rule that "placing a grantee 
in possession of a deed absolute on its face 
constitutes delivery and transfers title to him 
regardless of the imposition of any collateral 
condition or contingency as to its operative effect." 
3 Casner, American Law of Property 316-17, s 
12.66 (1952). Parol evidence is not admissible to 
show that a deed which has been executed and 
delivered is subject to any conditions not appearing 
on the face of the deed. 32A C.J.S. Evidence s 940 
(1964). See also Harmon v. Grants Pass B. & T. 
Co., **735 60 Or. 69, 75, 118 P. 188 (1911). 
Therefore, the execution and delivery of the 
quitclaim deed precludes High from now asserting 
rights under his membership agreement. 
Stearns testified that he was issued an executed 
copy of the agreement on the same day as 
Milbrandt, but that he did not know what happened 
to it. He also testified that he originally issued a 
note for $2,000 as consideration but that the note 
was canceled and Stearns was given the membership 
in exchange for promotional and other work he had 
done for JDRDC. Stearns hunted and fished on the 
property in 1965 and 1966. Stearns' testimony was 
corroborated by Milbrandt who testified that he was 
present when Stearns' membership agreement was 
executed. 
[14] The statute of frauds, ORS 41.580, provides 
that evidence of an agreement for the sale of an 
interest in real property must be proved by the 
writing or secondary evidence of its contents. 
Stearns has attempted to prove by oral testimony 
that there was a writing and the contents thereof. 
Normally such evidence would be precluded by the 
"best evidence rule," ORS 41.640, until the party 
shows that he could not produce the original writing 
in a reasonable time by the exercise of a reasonable 
effort to do so. Velasquez v. Freeman, 244 Or. 40, 
47, 415 P.2d 514 (1966). 
[15] Objection was made to the introduction of 
this evidence on the basis of the "best evidence rule" 
but *332 the objection was overruled because 
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Stearns "indicated he didn't know what happened to 
it." Technically speaking, the trial court should not 
have admitted the secondary evidence before 
determining the extent of Stearns' diligence in 
searching for the document, Velasquez, supra. We 
note, however, that the evidence overwhelmingly 
points to the fact that Steams' membership 
agreement was identical in form and content to all 
the other membership agreements involved in this 
case. Under such circumstances the following 
quotation from McCormick, Handbook on the Law 
of Evidence 577-78, s 243 (2d ed 1972), is 
appropriate: 
" * * * (T)he requirement of the production of 
original writings, with the several excuses for 
nonproduction and the exceptions to the 
requirement itself, make up a fairly complex set of 
regulations for administration by the trial judge. 
Mistakes in the application of these rules are, 
understandably, not infrequent. The purpose of 
this system of rules, on the other hand, is simple 
and practical. That purpose is to secure the most 
reliable information as to the contents of 
documents, when those terms are disputed. A 
mystical ideal of seeking 'the best evidence' or the 
'original document,' as an end in itself is no 
longer the goal. Consequently when an attack is 
made, on motion for new trial or on appeal, upon 
the judge's admission of secondary evidence, it 
seems that the reviewing tribunal, should 
ordinarily make inquiry of the complaining 
counsel, 'Does the party whom you represent 
actually dispute the accuracy of the evidence 
received as to the material terms of the writing?' 
If the counsel cannot assure the court that such a 
good faith dispute exists, it seems clear that any 
departure from the regulations in respect to 
secondary evidence must be classed as harmless 
error. (Footnote omitted)" 
We find as a fact that Stearns was issued a 
membership agreement identical in terms to those of 
the other members and is able to assert the rights 
created by the agreements. 
The issue of notice. 
[16] For Lomas & Nettleton's mortgage to be 
superior to the rights of the claimants, it must have 
taken its *333 mortgage in good faith for value and 
without notice of the outstanding interests. See 
Landigan v. Mayer, 32 Or. 245, 252, 51 P. 649 
(1898). The notice that will deprive the mortgagee 
of priority can be either actual or constructive. 
Actual notice is direct knowledge of the outstanding 
interest. See Seguin et al. v. Maloney-Chambers, 
198 Or. 272, 285, 253 P.2d 252, 256 P.2d 514 
(1953). Constructive notice encompasses both 
notice chargeable under the recording statute, ORS 
93.710, and "inquiry notice." See Belt et ux v. 
Matson et al., 120 Or. 313, 321, 252 P. 80 (1927). 
**736 [17] Lomas & Nettleton was not charged 
with record notice because the membership 
agreements were not properly acknowledged before 
recordation. ORS 93.480; 8 Thompson on Real 
Property 302-16, s 4304 (1963). If Lomas & 
Nettleton or an agent nevertheless had checked the 
record the company would then have had actual 
notice of the interests asserted by claimants. We 
find no evidence that Lomas & Nettleton had actual 
notice either by virtue of checking the records or 
otherwise. 
[18] We do find, however, that Lomas & 
Nettleton had "inquiry notice ." Before loaning 
funds to Skyline Enterprises, Inc., Lomas & 
Nettleton received a preliminary title report from a 
title company containing the following exceptions: 
"6. The right, title and interest of John Day 
Recreational Development Company, evidenced 
by the issuance of Founders memberships in an 
exclusive hunting and fishing club on the above 
premises, some of which are recorded. 
"7. The right, title and interest of the membership 
holders described at No. 6 above." 
The title insurance policies, as issued, also include 
exceptions for "the right, title and interest of 
membership holders in and to an exclusive hunting 
and fishing club under the rights and interest of the 
John Day Recreational Development Company." 
*334 We hold that under these circumstances 
Lomas & Nettleton had a duty to inquire of the 
organization or members asserting hunting and 
fishing rights to determine the extent of the interest 
claimed. Lomas & Nettleton failed to make such 
inquiry, but is now charged with notice of the facts 
that would have been discovered by such an inquiry. 
Belt et ux v. Matson et al., supra. It follows that 
Lomas & Nettleton's security interest has no priority 
over the interests of claimants. 
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Miscellaneous contentions. 
A. Lomas & Nettleton cannot assert a purported 
violation of the securities law. 
[19] Lomas & Nettleton contends that the sales of 
membership agreements were sales of securities and 
the failure to register these securities made their sale 
"void" under ORS 59.250, which was in force at the 
time of sale but has since been repealed. We need 
not decide whether the sale of membership 
agreements constituted the sale of securities because 
even if it did, Lomas & Nettleton has no standing by 
reason of the fact that it was not a party to the 
alleged illegal transaction. See Austin v. Hallmark 
Oil Co., 21 Cal.2d 718, 134 P.2d 777, 783 (1943), 
and Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal.2d 864, 69 
Cal.Rptr. 612, 652, 442 P.2d 692, 732 (1968), 
decided under the California statute (Cal.Corp.Code 
s 26100 (1965)), which also provided that sales of 
securities without a permit were "void." See also 
Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 131-33 (1958). 
B. A declaration that the membership agreements 
are valid is not inequitable. 
[20] Lomas & Nettleton contends that allowing 
the membership agreements priority over its 
mortgages would yield an inequitable result in thai 
the claimants had *335 unclean hands and would be 
unjustly enriched. 
There was no evidence that a violation of the 
securities law, if there was one, was knowing or 
intentional. We do not believe that under the 
circumstances of this case the claimants can be said 
to have "unclean hands." At any rate, the issue is 
the priority of interests in the foreclosure suit and 
iMs is not affected by any purported violation of the 
securities law. 
We also do not believe that the claimants will be 
unjustly enriched. They are receiving what they 
bargained and paid for. 
C. Lomas & Nettleton is not subrogated to the 
rights of lienholders whose claims were paid from 
the proceeds of the mortgages. 
[21][22] Lomas & Nettleton contends that the 
funds it supplied to Skyline were **737 used to 
discharge other liens which were prior to the 
interests of the claimants and that consequently it 
should be subrogated to the rights of the prior 
lienors to the extent those liens were paid by its 
funds. It is possible for a mortgagee to be 
subrogated to the rights of a prior lienor. See 
Annot., Subrogation to Prior Lien of One Who 
Advances Money to Discharge It and Takes New 
Mortgage, as Against Intervening Lienor, 70 
A.L.R. 1396 (1931); 83 C.J.S. Subrogation s 36, 
pp. 645-46 (1953). However, the principles which 
permit subrogation in these instances are equitable. 
Lomas & Nettleton had notice of the existence of 
membership agreements creating hunting and fishing 
rights, and chose to proceed with the mortgage 
transaction without further investigation. Under 
these circumstances, there are insufficient equities in 
its favor to convince us that it should be subrogated 
to the rights of prior lienors whose liens were 
discharged out of the mortgage proceeds, and thus to 
foreclose those hunting and fishing rights. 
In summary, then, we hold that except for High, 
who quitclaimed to Davis the rights he had acquired 
under his membership agreement, the claimants have 
interests in the property, by virtue of their 
membership agreements, which are superior to that 
of Lomas & Nettleton. The case is remanded for 
modification of the foreclosure decree in accordance 
with this opinion. 
LENT, Justice, specially concurring. 
I concur in the result and with the basic approach 
to that result. I must express my reservations, 
however, concerning the use of the term "reasonable 
certainty" to describe the quantum of persuasion 
necessary to establish a real property description by 
extrinsic evidence so as to avoid the impact of the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The term is merely a label which has no precise 
meaning; therefore, the trier of fact has a task 
impossible to perform upon a logical basis. If the 
court requires that the evidence to establish the 
property description be more than that necessary to 
establish the affirmative of the issue by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the court should 
candidly say so. If that is what Is meant by use of 
the term, I would then dissent for reasons to which I 
have alluded earlier. See Hardwick v. Dravo 
Equipment Company, 279 Or. 619, 630, 569 P.2d 
588 (1977) (Lent, J., specially concurring). 
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Compare, Jensen v. Miller, 280 Or. 225, 229, 570 
P.2d 375, 377 (1977), footnote 1. 
That this court has used the term in such ways as 
to illustrate its inherent imprecision appears from a 
comparison of its use in Dravo with its use in Cont. 
Plants v. Measured Mkt., 274 Or. 621, 624, 547 
P.2d 1368 (1976). In Dravo the term was used to 
described some measure greater than mere 
probability, while in Cont. Plants the court said that 
it meant no more than probability. It is true that 
both cases were concerned with the sufficiency of 
evidence to establish damages; however, I think that 
is a difference without distinction. The fact remains 
that the term is imprecise and tends to confuse. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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BRADLEY et al. v. FRAZIER PARK PLAY-
GROUNDS, Inc. et al. 
Civ. 4351. 
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
California. 
April 21, 1952. 
Hearing Denied June 19, 1952. 
Grace Bradley and others sued Frazier 
Park Playgrounds, Inc., and others to estab-
lish their right to use certain recreational 
facilities which were included within the 
real estate development in which they had 
bought lots relying upon salesmen's represen-
tations that they would have permanent use 
of such facilities without restriction. The 
Superior Court, Kern County, Robert B. 
Lambert, J., entered judgment for plaintiffs, 
and one defendant appealed. The District 
Court of Appeal, Griffin, J., held that plain-
tiffs were entitled to an equitable easement 
to use such facilities, though no such right 
of use or easement had been granted by writ-
ten conveyance. 
Affirmed. 
1. Easements <§=>I6 
Where, in advertising sale of lots in 
real estate development, lots were located 
on map showing playground area, club 
house, and lakes, and availability of such 
recreational facilities, which were owned 
by owner of development, was given great 
emphasis by promoters of development and 
there was evidence that purchasers of lots 
relied upon salesmen's representations that 
they would have permanent use of such fa-
cilities without restriction, such purchasers 
were entitled to equitable easement to use 
such facilities, though no such right of 
use or easement was granted by written 
conveyance. Civ.Code §§ 801 et seq., 1104. 
2. Easements €=>30(l), 61(8) 
Mere nonuser does not necessarily con-
stitute abandonment of an easement, and 
therefore in action to establish equitable 
easement, trial court did not abuse dis-
cretion in denying defendant right to amend 
answer so as to include defense of aban-
donment by reason of nonuser for over 14 
years. Civ.Code, §§ 801 et seq., 1104. 
3. Easements $=>36(3) 
In action by purchasers of lots in real 
estate development against successor in in-
terest of such development which included 
certain recreational facilities to establish 
equitable easement to use such facilities, 
evidence did not establish, as contended by 
defendant, that purchasers had abandoned 
or intended to abandon any of the rights 
claimed by nonuser for over 14 years. 
William R. Hulsy, Bakersfield, for appel-
lant. 
Siemon & Siemon, Bakersfield, for re-
spondents. 
GRIFFIN, Justice. 
In 1924, a real estate promotion was com-
menced by a group of real estate operators 
who had organized, in August, 1924, a 
corporation known as "Frazier Mountain 
Park and Fisheries Company, Inc." This 
corporation secured about 800 acres of real • 
property for subdivision purposes lying to 
the west of U. S. Highway 99, approximate-
ly on the border line between Kern County 
and Ventura County, in the mountainous 
area just south of Lebec. One Harry G. 
MacBain was president and the moving 
spirit in its promotion. In the heart of the 
subdivision was a playground area consist-
ing of about ten or twelve acres, sometimes 
desigpated in the evidence as the "com-
mons". It contained some springs and a 
grove of trees through which flowed the 
Cuddy Creek. Artificial lakes were ex-
cavated to take advantage of certain waters 
which were there available. Subdivision 
maps of the several tracts were duly re-
corded and lots were sold according to said 
maps. The entire subdivision contained in 
excess of 1700 numbered lots. The general 
subdivision map (Exhibit 1) which does not 
appear to have been recorded, designated 
-the numbered lots and showed the unnum-
bered area containing the "commons" and, 
the lakes above described. A footnote is 
set forth on that map as follows: "AU 
streets, trails, drives, or unnumbered areas 
adjacent thereto, are reserved for the use^  
of owners of real property within said sub-
division and are not dedicated to the pub-
l ic" 
The rustic clubhouse or lodge was erect* 
ed in this unnumbered area which wlfc lised) 
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as a meeting place for the residents and 
property owners and which was also used 
as the focal point in the promotion of the 
sale of lots in the subdivision. The Frazier 
park Water Company, a corporation, was 
organized in March, 1926, for the purpose 
of producing and distributing water to the 
lots in the subdivision. Upon the comple-
tion of payments, after the sale of the lots, 
each purchaser of a lot was entitled to re-
ceive two shares of stock in the water com-
pany. 
Mr. MacBain and his associates envi-
sioned the area as being a natural resort 
and playground spot, and took the steps 
which they considered necessary to make 
it so. Five artificial lakes were constructed 
in the playground area of the property. 
Cabins were erected for rentals, and the 
real estate promotion boomed. A large 
number of lots were sold for cabin sites, 
and many summer homes were erected with-
in the subdivided portions of the area. 
One of the selling points for the lots was 
the representation that with each lot the 
purchaser would receive the right to mem-
bership in a "Rod and Gun Club" (later to 
be called a "Rod and Reel Club") which 
club would own and operate the clubhouse 
and grounds, and which would maintain 
fish in the lakes, and would carry on the 
usual activities of a country club. Mem-
bership in the club was to be based either 
on ownership of lots in the subdivision or 
could be purchased by non-lot-owners at the 
discretion of the board of directors of the 
club. The printed matter furnished to po-
tential purchasers suggested that the club 
membership would increase in worth and 
and be of great value. The Frazier Moun-
tain Park and Fisheries Company, Inc., on 
October 8, 1928, borrowed a sum up to 
$400,000 on bearer promissory notes, se-
cured by a trust deed, not only on all of the 
unsold lots in the tracts numbered 1 to 5 
inclusive, in the area, but also the lots which 
had been sold on contract, and in addition, 
all of the unsubdivided portion of the land, 
including the area on which the lakes, play-
grounds, and clubhouse were situated. The 
Metropolitan Trust Company was named 
as trustee under the deed of trust 
All of the expenses incident to the clear-
ing of the playground area, the building of 
the clubhouse, the excavation for the lakes, 
the stocking of the lakes with fish, and 
the care and maintenance of the area, were 
borne by the real estate promoters up to the 
time that the Frazier Mountain Rod and 
Reel Club was created on March 1, 1926. 
(MacBain's attorney was one of the in-
corporates.) After that time the Rod and 
Reel Club operated the clubhouse and the 
grounds, stocked the lakes with fish, and 
generally conducted the area in the normal 
manner for the benefit of its members, col-
lecting dues, incurring expenses for the 
pumping of the water into the lakes, stock-
ing them with fish, and paying out money 
for care and improvements on the grounds. 
In 1933 the Rod and Reel Club was per-
mitted to lapse into inactivity from which 
it has never revived. Its unpaid obligation 
to the water company for water pumped 
into the lakes amounted to approximately 
$9,000. 
The Frazier Mountain Park and Fisheries 
Company, Inc., and its successor, the Harry 
G. MacBain Corporation, Ltd., used the 
usual and customary type of contract of 
sale for real property, which contained the 
words: "It is further agreed that the sell-
er shall, not be responsible or liable for any 
inducement, promise, representation, agree-
ment or stipulation not set forth herein." 
On its face it contained no grant of mem-
bership in the Rod and Reel Club, but on 
the reverse side there was printed: "Sample 
of Membership given with each lot", and 
'This certifies that is a member of 
the Frazier Mountain Park Rod and Reel 
Club and entitled to all the benefits and 
privileges thereto". The face of the deed 
contained merely the usual grants and re-
strictions, and contained no reference to 
the shares in the water company, the mem-
bership in the Rod and Reel Club, or any 
of the easements or rights here claimed. 
From the inception of the subdivision, ap-
parently there was great emphasis placed 
on the value of the area as a playground 
spot, and the fact that the property owners 
would be able to use the lakes, the club-
house, the playgrounds and the picnic 
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grounds, through their membership in the 
Rod and Reel club and by virtue of their 
ownership of the lots. During the trial 
there were numerous bits of testimony in 
which persons who later purchased lots, 
or who were considered as prospects, were 
told by salesmen for the owners that the 
whole area would be permanently available 
to them for their use as a playground. 
Also, advertisements were introduced into 
evidence which had been taken from local 
newspapers, etc., showing that there was a 
great deal of emphasis placed on the fact 
that the area would be devoted to use as a 
playground and that ownership in the lots 
would carry with it the right to catch 
fish in the various lakes. Salesmen em-
ployed by the owners also testified that they 
made these representations to prospective 
purchasers and that the permanent use of 
the playgrounds and lakes was without re-
striction. Several salesmen testified that 
Mr. MacBain and his sales agent author-
ized them to so represent the property to 
the prospective lot buyers. Many of the 
purchasers who testified stated that they 
relied on these representations and the 
court, by its decision, at least impliedly 
found that this was true. 
It appears that the 1929 depression so af-
fected the area that the sale of lots fell off, 
and the real estate promotion bogged down. 
By 1931, most of the activities of the area 
ceased, including the full operation of the 
clubhouse, the lakes, the grounds and the 
water company. 
In 1931, a group of residents undertook 
to operate the water company in order to 
supply water to the residents. Ultimately, 
a public utility district was formed, and 
the furnishing and distribution of water 
was taken over by the defendant Frazier 
Park Public Utility District, a public cor-
poration. 
The Harry G. MacBain Corporation, 
Ltd., kept a caretaker on the premises until 
1932, when possession was released to the 
Metropolitan Trust Company, as trustee, 
under the deed of trust above mentioned. 
The clubhouse grounds and lakes were 
used occasionally by the residents and prop-
erty owners and on occasion the clubhouse 
was open to groups for rental with the per-
mission of the caretaker. 
On July 19, 1940, the Pacific Capital, Ltd., 
a corporation, filed an action in the Su-
perior Court of Los Angeles County against 
the Metropolitan Trust Company, as trus-
tee, and against the owners of the bearer 
notes which had been given at the time of 
the floating of the loan. It prayed, among 
other things, that Harry G. MacBain Cor-
poration surrender its bearer notes to the 
trustee in exchange for a quitclaim deed 
from the Metropolitan Trust Company to 
the purchasers who had purchased lots from 
the Frazier Mountain Park and Fisheries 
Company, Inc., or from the Harry G. Mac-
Bain Corporation, Ltd., its successor, which 
purchasers had paid the full purchase price 
for the property, but for which there had 
been no release secured from the trust com-
pany. It also asked that the trustee be in-
structed to dispose of the property because 
of the fact that the trustor corporation had 
for many years failed to operate the club-
house, swimming pool, playgrounds, lakes, 
and other improvements on the property, 
and that the trust company had advanced 
sums to pay taxes and insurance on the 
clubhouse and upon the improved portions 
of the unsubdivided property, and because it 
had been forced to maintain, at its expense, 
a caretaker on the property. That court 
granted the relief prayed for and ordered 
the trust company to immediately take 
measures looking toward the sale of the 
trust property to defray costs of adminis-
tration of the trust, and ordered that any 
balance be paid to the bearers of the promis-
sory notes. 
The trust company unsuccessfully at-
tempted to sell the real property to the 
county of Kern to be used by the county as 
a recreational area for $12,500. Subse-
quently, the Frazier Park .Playgrounds, Inc., 
a corporation, was formed by defendant 
Harry H. Holland for the purpose of pur-
chasing the property. In December, 1941, 
it purchased the property, including the 
clubhouse, grounds, and lakes, from the 
trust company for $12,500, 09 an agreement 
of sale by the terms of which the corpora-
tion took title to the property and gave back 
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a deed of trust for $7,500, being the unpaid 
balance of the purchase price. The unsold 
lots in the subdivision were quitclaimed 
by the trust company to the Frazier Park 
Playgrounds, Inc., because many of them 
had been forfeited to the State for unpaid 
taxes. The unsubdivided portion of the 
property was conveyed to the Frazier Park 
Playgrounds, Inc., by grant deed. There-
after, the Frazier Park Playgrounds, Inc., 
attempted to open the clubhouse commer-
cially but it was never able to operate it 
on a profitable basis. Thereafter, there was 
occasional use of the swings, croquet court, 
clubhouse and horseshoe pits by residents 
and lot owners. 
In 1947, the Frazier Park Playgrounds, 
Inc. fenced the clubhouse and the play-
grounds, and permitted cattle to graze in the 
enclosed area. This act was met with 
strong disapproval by persons who owned 
lots in the subdivided portion of the area, 
and this action was filed by four of them, 
as representatives of a class, to have their 
rights determined to the use of the club-
house, playgrounds, swings, right to take 
water, and to fish in the lakes without hin-
drance. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged all of the 
facts hereinabove mentioned and prayed 
that the rights of the plaintiffs, as mem-
bers of a class, be recognized by law, and 
enforced, and that the defendant Frazier 
Park Playgrounds, Inc., be required to re-
move its fence, and that it grant the plain-
tiffs, as members of a class, the right to 
perpetual use of the clubhouse, lakes, play-
grounds, and other improvements within 
the unsubdivided area. 
Defendant Frazier Park Playgrounds, 
Inc., answered that it was a successor in in-
terest of the Metropolitan Trust Company 
which had sold the trust property at a dis-
tress sale, under instructions from the 
court It denied that the plaintiffs had any 
rights to the property and alleged that this 
property had remained unused for many 
years. However, it failed to specifically 
plead abandonment of these claimed rights 
by the plaintiffs. 
The court found generally in accordance 
with the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, 
including the allegations that the grounds 
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which included the springs constituted a 
natural park and that the property which 
was subdivided had been sold to the public, 
with the representation that the area, which 
contained the swings, playgrounds, walks, 
artificial lakes, and clubhouse, including 
the springs, had been sold to purchasers 
with the representation that they would be 
entitled, perpetually, to the use thereof; 
that these claimed rights were at all times 
open and notorious and of common knowl-
edge. It specifically found that there had 
been no public dedication of this area for 
the purposes indicated. Judgement was en-
tered accordingly and by mandatory in-
junction the court specifically designated 
the property to which the easement related 
and granted unrestricted and uninhibited 
ingress thereto and egress therefrom by 
the property owners, and restrained appel-
lant Harry H. Holland, successor in interest 
to the Frazier Park Playgrounds, Inc., and 
his agents, from in any manner interfering 
with or obstructing said uses, and further 
ordered that a prescribed portion of the 
fence surrounding the area be removed, and 
required the defendants to permit the own-
ers of lots in said tracts to have ready ac-
cess to the same and to the clubhouse and 
to the other improvements thereon, without 
hindrance, subject, however, to certain pre-
scribed rules. It was ordered that plain-
tiffs take nothing against defendant Frazier 
Park Public Utility District, a corporation. 
Harry H. Holland, as successor in in-
terest of the Frazier Park Playgrounds, Inc. 
appealed from the judgment 
The evidence fully supports the court's 
finding that it was the intention of the sub-
divider and of its sales agents to create and 
set aside a portion of the subdivision as a 
"commons" or playgrounds, for the speci-
fied use and benefit of the purchasers of 
lots, in perpetuity. The subdivision map so 
indicates. The price obtained for the lots 
clearly indicates such rights were con-
sidered a portion of the price paid. Appel-
lant Holland and his predecessors in in-
terest apparently had knowledge of these 
facts or, at least, evidence of these claimed 
rights and privileges was, as found by the 
court, so notorious and of such common 
knowledge as to impart notice to them. 
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The evidence shows that Holland lived 
near the park before, during and after its 
inception and visited it during the sale and 
promotion of the tract; that in 1935, he 
bought adjoining land; that in 1941, he and 
a lot owner in the park who purchased his 
lot on the representation that the unsub-
divided portion was reserved for the use 
of the lot owners, joined in forming the 
Frazier Mountain Park Playgrounds, Inc., 
for the purpose of buying a portion of the 
tract with the idea of conducting a private 
park enterprise. (Holland subsequently 
purchased this lot owner's interest in the 
corporation.) 
In Ocean Shore R. R. Co. v. Spring 
Valley Water Company, 218 Cal. 86, 21 P.2d 
588, the court held that every person hav-
ing actual notice of circumstances suffi-
cient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as 
to a particular fact is charged with con-
structive notice of the fact itself in all cas-
es in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, 
he might have learned such fact. That case 
quoted with approval from Chicago & E. I. 
R. R. v. Wright, 153 111. 307, 38 N.E. 1062, 
wherein it is said (quoting from Indiana, 
B. & W. R. Co. v. McBroom, 114 Ind. 198, 
15 N.E. 831): 
"' "A person who is about to pur-
chase land upon which a grade for a 
railroad is constructed is warned that 
there is some claim of right, and if he 
fails to make proper inquiry as to the 
nature of the claim he buys at his 
peril;" * * * A man cannot buy 
property where there are facts known 
to him sufficient to put him upon in-
quiry, and hold it free from prior 
claims or equities of which due inquiry 
would have given him information/ " 
[218 Cal. 86, 21 P.2d 589.] (See also, 
Wallace v. Whitmore, 47 Cal.App.2d 
369, 374, 117 P.2d 926; De La Cuesta 
v. Bazzi, 47 Cal.App.2d 661, 668, 118 
P.2d 909; and 74 A.L.R. 1250; 9 Cal. 
Jur. p. 956, sec. 10.) 
[1] The main question involved is the 
authority of the trial court to hold that 
the property owners in the area were en-
titled to a so-called "equitable easement" to 
the use of the grounds, clubhouse, and lakes, 
where no such right of use or easement was 
granted by the written conveyance. 
It was said in Danielson v. Sykes, 157 
Cal. 686, 109 P. 87, 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 1024, 
that where a lot conveyed by deed is de-
scribed by reference to a map, such map is 
made a part of the deed; that if streets are 
marked on the ground in the absence of a 
map, and lots are sold on the representation 
that such streets exist, the appurtenant 
right to use the streets, not expressed in 
the deed, rests upon an equitable estoppel; 
that the right of the owner may be enforced 
in equity with respect to all the streets 
which the particular lot owner has occasion 
to use; and any street or alley in close 
vicinity to a lot owner, which either is or 
may become of substantial benefit to him, 
will be protected against closure by injunc-
tion. Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298, 
49 P. 178, as well as many other authorities, 
are cited therein. See, also, Davidow v. 
Griswold, 23 Cal.App. 188, 192, 137 P. 619; 
Sees. 801 et seq., 1104, Civ.Code. The au-
thorities cited support the findings and 
iudgment of the court 
[2-4] The remaining question involves 
the ruling of the trial court in denying to 
appellant the right to amend his answer to 
include the defense of abandonment of the 
easemenj: claimed by reason of the nonuser 
thereof for over 14 years. No abuse of dis-
cretion appears in this respect for several 
reasons. First, it was not originally al-
leged as one of the defenses to said action. 
Second, mere nonuser does not necessarily 
constitute abandonment 1 Caljur. p. 12, 
§ 8; People v. Southern Pacific Company, 
172 Cal. 692, 158 P. 177; Flanagan v. San 
Marcos Silk Company, 106 Cal.App.2d 
458, 235 P^d 107. The showing here made 
does not indicate that the lot owners, as 
such, had abandoned or intended to abandon 
any of the so-called rights herein claimed, 
nor is there any offer of proof indicating 
this fact. Ocean Shore R. R. Co. v. Spring 
Valley Water Company, 87 CaLApp. 188, 
262 P. 53. It further appears that the trial 
judge did give some consideration to this 
contention and in his written opinion, as 
pointed out by appellant, the court did make 
a direct finding that there was no abandon-
ment and that the showing of nonuser was 
the only possible evidence of abandonment 
produced. It therefore does not appear that 
appellant would have been successful had 
the court permitted him to plead abandon-
ment. No prejudicial error appears in the 
ruling of the trial court. 
Judgment affirmed. 
BARNARD, P. J., and MUSSELL, J., 
concur. 
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Cite as 242 P.2d 963 
ployment of an agent to sell realty must 
show an authority to negotiate sale on be-
half of owner. Civ.Code, § 1624. 
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HERRING v. 
Civ. 
F ISHER eta!. 
18852. 
District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 2, California. 
April 8, 1952. 
Action by Willard Herring against Floyd 
0. Fisher, Elfleda Properties, Inc. to re-
cover commissions for sale of real property. 
The Superior Court, Los Angeles County 
William S. Baird, J., entered judgment for 
plaintiff and defendants appealed. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Moore, P. J., held 
that broker, who was authorized by presi-
dent of corporation to sell certain proper-
ties for $20,000 net to vendors, where bro-
ker brought the properties to vendee's at-
tention, exhibited them to him and received 
his written offer to buy accompanied by 
$500 as partial payment and thereafter 
closed transaction directly with vendee 
whereby vendors received $21,500, was enti-
tled to compensation. 
Judgment reversed with directions. 
McComb, J.f dissented. 
1. Brokers £=>7f 40 
Mere action of an owner in naming a 
price in writing to a broker at which owner 
is willing to sell his real property does not 
constitute an employment of the broker or 
bind owner to pay a commission. 
2. Brokers G=»43(2) 
A memorandum of an owner to be suf-
ficient under statute of fraud relative to em-
3. Brokers <S»49(I), 50 
To bind owner to pay a commission to 
a broker authorized to sell real estate, brok-
er must have sold real estate on the precise 
terms of his contract and within the period 
of his agency. 
4. Brokers <§=>54, 84(2) 
In action to recover commission for 
sale of real property, even though broker 
was authorized to negotiate, before com-
mission would be earned, it was not suffi-
cient that he had found a willing purchaser, 
but purchaser must have had ability to pay 
and the burden was on the broker to show 
the financial ability of his prospective ven-
dee. 
5. Brokers €=>43(2) 
When provision of statute of fraud re-
quiring some note or memorandum setting 
forth the terms of employment of a person 
to sell realty to be in writing, signed by the 
owner has been met with reference to a 
definite parcel, the agreement to pay a com-
mission and its amount may be shown by 
parol. Civ.Code, § 1624. 
6. Brokers <§=>43(3) 
In, action to recover commission for 
sale of real property, a formal written au-
thorization with all the terms agreed upon 
is not essential to warrant a finding of em-
ployment. 
7. Brokers <§=>43(3) 
Letters written by an operator dealing 
in properties to a realty broker, which did 
not designate property by legal description, 
or commission by percentage or specific 
brokerage, but did describe the property by 
a number on a public street and did fix the 
price and specify the terms of the sale of 
the property, were sufficient to coimply with 
the statute of frauds requiring some note or 
memorandum setting forth terms of em-
ployment of a person to sell realty to be in 
writing, signed by the owner. Civ.Code, § 
1624. 
8. Brokers <§=>84(l) 
In action to recover commission for 
sale of real property, where no commission, 
